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I. INTRODUCTION
The tax treatment of advance receipts, which include prepaid ser-
vices income, loans, and deposits, remains a conceptually unsettled
area of the law.1 Commentators taking opposed positions have char-
acterized current law, and those who interpret it, as "wrong,"' 2 "mis-
guided, '' 3 "insufficiently conscious of ... tax values," 4 and guilty of
"bad economics, bad accounting and bad tax law."' 5 The same long-
standing principles, such as that loan proceeds are not an accession to
wealth under a realization-based income tax or that one's basis in ser-
vices or property to be provided in the future is relevant to the
amount of income one has on a present receipt, have been described
as "basic ' 6 and "demonstrably false,"'7 while articles by respected
commentators that purport to transmit to judges and other legal ac-
tors principles that are "well understood ' 8 within at least some
quarters of tax academia advance ideas that other tax scholars hotly
contest.9
On reflection, it is not entirely surprising that the treatment of ad-
vance receipts should lie in a state of confusion. For one thing, the
actual rules seem to lack a basic rationale. In a word, they appear to
be inconsistent. Amounts termed "deposits" generally are not taxable
to the recipient,10 whereas prepaid rent is." Loan proceeds are not
taxable to the recipient,12 but prepaid services income almost always
1 See Joseph M. Dodge, Exploring the Income Tax Treatment of Borrowing and Liabili-
ties, or Why the Accrual Method Should Be Eliminated, 26 Va. Tax Rev. 245, 274 (2007)
(discussing the history of the taxation of debt).
2 Calvin H. Johnson, The Illegitimate "Earned" Requirement in Tax and Nontax Ac-
counting, 50 Tax L. Rev. 373, 379 (1995).
3 William A. Klein, Tailor to the Emperor with No Clothes: The Supreme Court's Tax
Rules for Deposits and Advance Payments, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 1685, 1687 (1994). Klein
makes a valiant effort to vindicate a result similar to the one that is advocated here, but his
argument rests on assumptions that later theorists have rejected, such as that even loan
proceeds should not be included in income. See, e.g., Klein, supra, at 1698 (assuming that
interchangeability of advance payment with borrowing demonstrates no income in either
case); see generally Dodge, note 1. As explicated below, the argument here seeks to justify
these principles as well, purely in terms of the concept of income.
4 Deborah A. Geier, The Myth of the Matching Principle as a Tax Value, 15 Am. J. Tax
Pol'y 17, 20 (1998).
5 Johnson, note 2, at 379.
6 Dodge, note 1, at 253 n.34.
7 Klein, note 3, at 1687.
8 Geier, note 4, at 25.
9 Compare, e.g., Geier, note 4, at 22 and passim (arguing that the matching principle is
not a "tax value"), with Klein, note 3, at 1691 and passim (advocating a position closely
related to the matching principle).
10 Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 493 U.S. 203 (1990).
11 Reg. § 1.61-8(b).
12 Klein notes that the exclusion of loan proceeds from gross income "has been regarded
as so self-evidently correct that the only authority for it is case law on whether particular
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iS. 1 3 In many cases, the distinctions among these types of receipts ap-
pear to be purely formal. At the same time, however, it is not at all
clear how the rules can be made consistent without violating deep-
seated intuitions about proper outcomes in particular cases. For ex-
ample, if loan proceeds were taxed on receipt and deducted on repay-
ment, it would become unclear why (at least some portion of the value
of) rental property also should not be taxed on transfer to the renter
(and possibly deductible on its return). However attractive a goal
consistency in the rules may be, the taxation of renters on receipt of
rental property seems too high a price to pay.
Second, the formality of the rules means that they are subject to
manipulation. It is easy enough to convert a deposit into prepaid rent
and vice-versa without changing the underlying economics of the
transaction. 14 Likewise, the similarities between an ordinary loan
from a third-party lender and an employer's advance against future
salary income suggest that distinct tax treatment of the two arrange-
ments is inappropriate. If the rules are formal, then tax electivity is
easy. The question becomes how to draft the papers, not how to
structure the economic transaction.
Under these circumstances, it is easy to understand why the aspira-
tion for a theory that would identify and tax the income generated in
advance payment situations becomes particularly powerful, and why
the theory itself has proved elusive. A regime that would better track
the underlying realities of advance payments would remedy the arbi-
trariness and electivity of current law; by the same token, if it seems
that any set of rules that would tax advance payments on the basis of
their substance yields unacceptable results, the theory itself seems
unattainable.
This Article makes three points that clarify why the problem of tax-
ing advance receipts has remained intractable and why apparently in-
consistent rules in this area may make sense. The first is that there has
been a general failure to recognize the significance of questions of tax
administration to the formulation of appropriate rules. Thus, it is
helpful to distinguish the basic questions of when and whether some-
one in receipt of an advance receipt has true economic income from
timing questions relevant for purposes of tax administration. Ad-
vance payments raise two timing questions, each of which is associated
with its own "tax values." The first concerns the actual time at which
transactions are in fact loans or on the consequences of a loan transaction." Klein, note 3,
at 1691 (footnotes omitted).
13 See, e.g., Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963) (prepayments for dance les-
sons includible). But see Artnell Co. v. Commissioner, 400 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1968) (pre-
payments for parking at baseball games not includible). These cases are discussed below.
14 See Klein, note 3, at 1696-97.
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a taxpayer can be said to have income; the second is the related ad-
ministrative question of the appropriate time to tax the taxpayer. The
latter has to do with the practicalities of collecting tax, whereas the
former has to do with the income concept itself. The rules that courts
and the Service have developed for particular types of payments are,
for the most part, answers to the second question, and they are gener-
ally reasonable. But looking for analytical cogency from these rules,
as many commentators have done, is bound to be fruitless if the rules
are thought to embody a coherent income concept. The rules do not
hew to any definition of income but make sense, to the extent they do,
in light of the importance of collecting tax when it seems a tax will
arise and a fund is available to pay it.
The second point is that both authorities and commentators have
occasionally subsumed the timing question to the "matching" ques-
tion. "Matching" refers to the principle of associating a particular in-
come item with the costs the taxpayer incurs in order to earn it.
15
Frequently, amounts received in a prior period that will not be earned
until a future period will not result in the taxpayer's incurring of asso-
ciated expenditures until the future period either. Under generally
accepted accounting principles, it typically is inappropriate to treat
such a receipt as income until the associated expenses have been in-
curred or at least accounted for.16 Commentators have observed that
while this rule makes sense from a financial accounting perspective,
the values that underlie the accounting treatment do not necessarily
support deferral for tax purposes. 17 On occasion they then have gone
on to conclude that the rejection of the matching principle for tax ac-
counting suggests that current taxation of advance receipts is correct
after all.18 While I concur in the judgment that the matching principle
ought not determine the timing of inclusions for tax purposes, I do not
agree that current inclusion of advance receipts thereby follows. Con-
ceptually, tax inclusion or deferral turns upon considerations that
arise on the income side, not the deduction side. The issue is whether
the activities that support inclusion have occurred, not whether ex-
penses that will or may be incurred in connection with performance
arise now or in a future period. Typically, in the case of an advance
receipt, some or all of the activities that discharge or retire the recipi-
ent's obligation do not occur on receipt. It is this nondischarge, and
15 Geier, note 4, at 18-19.
16 Id. at 28.
17 See, e.g., Alan Gunn, Matching of Costs and Resources as a Goal of Tax Accounting,
4 Va. Tax Rev. 1, 12 (1984).
18 See, e.g., Geier, note 4, at 114. This is the position consistently taken by the Commis-
sioner. See, e.g., Gunn, note 17, at 20 (observing that "the Commissioner has been content
to exercise ... discretion [to reject deferral] without justifying his choice").
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
[Vol. 61:
THE TAX TREATMENT OF ADVANCE RECEIPTS
not the fact of looming rather than current associated expenditures,
that justifies deferral in many advance receipt contexts.
Finally, all parties-courts, the government, and commentators-have
improperly imported cash flow taxation concepts into their analyses of
advance payments. The result has been to apply income tax criteria to
some types of advance payments and wealth or consumption tax crite-
ria to others. Not surprisingly, such disparately motivated efforts have
yielded inconsistent results, because an income tax frequently will ap-
ply at a different time and for different reasons than will a consump-
tion or a wealth tax. 19 While there may be sound administrative
reasons to adopt cash flow tax rules for a variety of advance payments
under the income tax, conceptual clarity will never be attained by fail-
ing to recognize that that is what one is doing. Thus, concepts such as
control over the receipt or the type of use (business or personal) to
which the receipt is put may have a bearing on workable income tax
rules, but they should not be enlisted in an effort to support a view
about when a taxpayer economically has income or a loss. From a
purely conceptual standpoint, control and use are relevant to wealth
and consumption taxation but not to income taxation.
Part II sets the stage for the analysis by describing current law for a
variety of advance payments and identifying differences in their tax
treatments. Part III examines the underlying issue of when an individ-
ual can be said to have income under established income concepts.
Part IV returns to the particular kinds of advance payments discussed
in Part II, examining them in light of established income concepts and
with a focus on tax administration.
II. ADvANCE RECEIPTS
For purposes of the following discussion, I define advance receipts
broadly to include any amount received, in money or kind or even
services, in exchange for the provision in some future period of money
or services, or for the promise to return the amount or some portion
thereof that was transferred.20 For example, a service recipient may
pay a service provider for next year's work this year (prepaid services
income), 21 or a lessee may prepay rent. Loans and deposits also are
19 See, e.g., Daniel N. Shaviro, When Rules Change (2000) (discussing the real and ad-
ministrative differences between income and consumption taxes).
20 I do not discuss property sale transactions such as forward and future contracts, which
are the subject of an extensive literature. See, e.g., David Levy, Towards Equal Tax Treat-
ment of Economically Equivalent Financial Instruments: Proposals for Taxing Prepaid
Forward Contracts, Equity Swaps, and Certain Contingent Debt Instruments, 3 Fla. Tax
Rev. 471 (1997).
21 See, e.g., Am. Auto. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 367 U.S. 687 (1961) (subjecting such
income to tax when received).
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advance receipts. In a loan, the lender transfers loan proceeds to the
borrower, who incurs an offsetting obligation to repay the amount in
the future as well as, typically, an ongoing obligation to pay interest
on outstanding principal. In a deposit, the recipient may hold the
money for or on behalf of the depositor as a reserve against future
fixed or contingent obligations; often the deposit is held as a fund to
cover payment for the provision of future services to the depositor or
against possible claims the holder may have against the depositor.
22
At the limit, even a lessee may be said to have an advance receipt on
taking possession of rental property, the offsetting obligations being
rent and the transfer of the leased property back to the lessor at the
end of the lease term.
The rules applicable to many kinds of advance receipts are settled
(if seemingly contradictory), while in other instances they are less
clear. For example, it is well established that the proceeds of an ordi-
nary, fixed-rate loan are neither includible in income when received
nor deductible from income when repaid;23 if a loan obligation is can-
celed, then the borrower typically has income to the extent of the can-
celed obligation,24 subject to relief in certain cases.25 The lender has a
bad debt deduction or a deductible loss. 26 Similarly, it is undisputed
that prepaid rent is includible in gross income of the recipient 27 and, if
it is a business expenditure, amortizable or deductible to the renter.
28
By contrast, advance payments received by accrual method taxpayers
in exchange for future services may or may not be includible on re-
ceipt, depending upon how tightly the recipient can tie the sum re-
ceived to the provision of specific services at a specific time. Where it
is possible to associate the payments closely enough with the services,
income recognition is deferred until the service is provided;29 in most
22 See Boris I. Bittker & Lawrence Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates, and
Gifts 105.5 (2005).
23 Klein, note 3, at 1691; see also text at nn.121-23.
24 IRC § 61(a)(12); see also Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 317 (holding that can-
cellation of nonrecourse debt in excess of fair market value of property secured thereby
results in increased amount realized on disposition of property).
25 IRC § 108(a). Exceptions to inclusion include insolvency, cancellations of debt with
respect to items that would be deductible if paid, as well as cancellation of qualified home
acquisition indebtedness.
26 IRC § 166 (bad debts), § 165 (losses).
27 Reg. § 1.61-8(b). Section 467 overrides the standard treatment of prepaid (and post-
paid) rent in the case of certain "section 467 rental agreements," which generally include
agreements providing for pre- or postpaid rent where the total rental payments under the
agreement exceed $250,000 and other conditions are satisfied. See Bittker & Lokken, note
22, $ 105.7. Notably, the statute tracks what I argue below are the real items of income
and expense associated with prepayments.
28 Rev. Rul. 74-589, 1974-2 C.B. 286; Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(d).
29 See, e.g., Artnell Co. v. Commissioner, 400 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1968); Collegiate Cap &
Gown Co. v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. 960 (1978); see also Rev. Proc. 2004-34, 2004-22
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instances, however, the service recipient will be unable to establish the
required nexus and the payments will be taxed on receipt. 30 The fol-
lowing discussion elaborates on the taxation of these arrangements.
A. Deposits Versus Prepaid Services Income
Perhaps nowhere are the difficulties with the courts' and the Ser-
vice's approach to advance receipts more obvious than in authorities
dealing with deposits. As a general matter, an amount that qualifies
as a deposit is treated as neither includible by the payee nor deducti-
ble by the payor, while prepaid services income or rent typically is
included on receipt. 31 The rules for categorizing a receipt as one or
the other have shifted over time and have varied across jurisdictions.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner v. Indianapo-
lis Power & Light Co.,32 the Tax Court employed a facts and circum-
stances, or "earmarks," 33 test that sought to determine whether the
recipient treated the amount as an item held on the payor's account,
or instead as a down payment on a future expected income item.
34
Under the earmarks approach, the payee's reasons for collecting the
prepayment are not generally relevant to whether the item is income
on receipt. Some circuit courts, however, applied a "primary pur-
pose" test under which the determinative factor was whether the pay-
ment was intended to secure a future income item (such as payment
for services) or instead to secure a nonincome covenant (such as for
possible damage to equipment). 35 Here it was not the features of the
payment but the purpose of collecting it that determined its tax
treatment.
I.R.B. 991 (permitting up to one year of deferral for certain advance payments to the ex-
tent they are received for items (including services, property, certain warranties, and other
items) not attributable to amounts either reflected on the taxpayer's financials for the year
of receipt or "earned" in the year of receipt).
30 See, e.g., Am. Auto. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 367 U.S. 687 (1961) (automobile club
dues); Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963) (dance lessons). The Service has
provided partial relief for certain advance payments in Revenue Procedure 71-21, 1971-2
C.B. 549. Amounts received in a year in respect of goods or services to be provided in a
subsequent year may be deferred until the year after receipt (but not thereafter) if, among
other things, the taxpayer defers the receipt until delivery of the goods or services under its
normal method of accounting.
31 Rev. Proc. 71-21, 1971-2 C.B. 549, modified and superseded by Rev. Proc. 2004-34,
2004-22 I.R.B. 991; Reg. § 1.61-8(b). But see IRC § 467 (putting lessors and lessees on
accrual method in the case of certain "section 467 rental agreements" (generally those
involving total rent in excess of $250,000 where there is substantial pre- or post-payment
of rent).
32 493 U.S. 203 (1990).
33 The term is Klein's. Klein, note 3, at 1714.
34 City Gas Co. of Florida v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 386 (1980), rev'd, 689 F.2d 943 (11th
Cir. 1982).
35 City Gas Co., 689 F.2d 943.
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The Supreme Court attempted to bring some clarity to the area in
Indianapolis Power,36 but the effort has been widely criticized as rely-
ing on formal distinctions that have no basis in economics or tax the-
ory.37 In Indianapolis Power, the question was whether amounts that
an electric utility collected as security for payment against future ser-
vices from customers who had a history of delinquent payments were
nontaxable deposits or prepaid services income. The amounts were
twice the expected monthly utility bill. Initially, the utility paid 3%
interest on the sums held at least six months. Later it paid 6%, but
only to the extent sums were held more than twelve months, with 0%
paid prior thereto. Unclaimed amounts held for more than seven
years escheated to the state. Customers could secure repayment by
requesting it and demonstrating acceptable credit (or by terminating
their service). The utility treated the amounts on its books as deposits
belonging to the customers, though it did not segregate the deposits
from its own funds. The utility's noninclusion of the amounts in in-
come for accounting purposes was consistent with generally accepted
accounting principles and applicable state law.
The Tax Court held the amounts were not income on receipt. 38 In
the court's view, the question was whether the primary purpose of the
payment was to acquire security for future services should they be
provided, or instead to obtain income ahead of future services on the
expectation that they would be provided. To answer that question, the
court looked to the rights transferred to Indianapolis Power & Light
and those retained by the depositor. The fact that the utility required
the advance payments from only 5% of customers (those from whom
it was reasonable to request security), the depositors retained ultimate
control over disposition of the amounts, and the utility paid depositors
interest all supported treatment of the amounts as security deposits
rather than advance income.39 The Seventh Circuit affirmed on essen-
tially the same rationale.
40
The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed, but its reasoning differed
slightly. 41 Accepting that a material difference exists between a de-
posit (no inclusion on receipt) and a prepayment (immediate inclusion
in most circumstances), the Court looked to the circumstances under
which repayment, if any, would likely be forthcoming as a basis to
distinguish between the two types of receipts. It concluded that legal
36 493 U.S. 203.
37 Geier and Klein criticize Indianapolis Power & Light, though on different grounds.
See Geier, note 4, at 130-31; Klein, note 3, at 1718-23.
38 Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 964 (1980).
39 Id. at 977.
40 Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. Commissioner, 857 F.2d 1152 (7th Cir. 1988).
41 Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. Commissioner, 493 U.S. 203 (1990).
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entitlement to demand a repayment in cash more likely signals a de-
posit; where, however, cash is available to the payor merely as a rem-
edy for the recipient's failure to perform, the amount generally is
includible on receipt.
42
Commentators have rightly pointed to the incoherence of the
Court's reasoning as a matter of economics or tax theory. In an ex-
tended discussion, William Klein argues that the asserted distinction
between a loan, to which the Court likens a deposit, and advance ser-
vices income is essentially nil: The method by which the recipient of
the amount finances the receipt is irrelevant to the economic conse-
quences of the receipt. 43 In both cases the recipient receives the right
to use a payment for a period of time prior to the date she discharges
her obligation. Either both should be included on receipt, or neither
should.44 Joseph Dodge, advocating a cash flow approach to prepay-
ments generally, reaches the same conclusion on the question of con-
sistency: There is no basis for treating the two kinds of receipts
differently.
45
As to which rule is correct, disagreement prevails. Klein takes the
position that the offsetting liability rationale that precludes inclusion
in income of loan proceeds on receipt (and, correspondingly, prevents
deduction of principal as it is repaid) is the correct rule generally for
advance receipts of all kinds.46 Dodge, by contrast, asserts that the
question is whether the taxpayer enjoys an accession to wealth during
the tax period. Recognizing that a pure accrual-based income tax
would not necessarily support this approach, Dodge argues that under
our realization-based tax system, rules parallel to those for built-in
gain or loss on the asset side of the ledger ought to apply to liabilities.
According to Dodge, as a general matter a realization-based income
tax should disregard future obligations to the extent they are "unreal-
ized," which is to say that payment is not due in the current period.
From this perspective, the receipt is not offset by an obligation, and
therefore it constitutes an accession to wealth.
47
Deborah Geier suggests a third position that would accurately tax
the loan element implicit in the arrangement, without necessarily tax-
ing the entire deposit on receipt.48 Recognizing, however, that bifur-
cating such a receipt may be difficult in particular cases, she suggests a
42 Id. at 207-08.
43 Klein, note 3, at 1713-23.
44 Id.
45 Dodge, note 1, at 256-65.
46 Klein, note 3, at 1730. The offsetting obligation rationale is discussed in detail in
Section II.C.
47 Dodge, note 1, at 265-71.
48 Geier, note 4, at 133.
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rule of full taxation or not, depending on whether the interest element
constitutes more than half of the deposit.49 Like Klein and Dodge, as
well as a number of other commentators, 50 she views the Court's ef-
fort in Indianapolis Power as misbegotten.51
B. Prepaid Services Income
There is similar disagreement with respect to advance payments for
services where no fund amounting to a deposit is maintained or as-
serted. In terms of standard tax doctrine, such amounts differ from
deposits because, unlike deposits, they are considered to be income to
the recipient on receipt, and the only question that arises is whether
the period of receipt, rather than some other period, is the appropri-
ate time to levy tax.52 In the majority of cases, amounts received as
payment during the year in exchange for services to be performed in a
later year are included on receipt.53 The operation of this rule for
cash method taxpayers has always been relatively unproblematic, but
the rules for accrual method taxpayers remain somewhat unsettled. In
a trilogy of cases decided by the Supreme Court in the 1950's and
1960's, the general rule emerged that even accrual method taxpayers
must include on receipt amounts received for future services. 54 In
each case, the taxpayer received an amount in a year prior to the year
in which the taxpayer would be called upon to provide services, and in
each case the quantity of services (but not the amount of the payment
to which the taxpayer was entitled) that the taxpayer would be called
upon to provide was uncertain.
These decisions seem to reflect a rejection of the "matching princi-
ple" as a basis for tax accounting. Under the matching principle,
amounts are not treated as income for financial accounting purposes
until the period in which the expenses associated with the right to re-
tain the income are incurred. 55 The taxpayers in these cases generally
argued that the accrual method of accounting for income tax purposes
embodies the same principle. The accrual method is designed to pro-
vide an accurate measure of income, but if they were required to in-
clude prepayments without taking into account the costs of earning
the prepayment, the tax law would provide an inaccurate measure of
49 Id. at 136.
50 Yin, note 37, at 469 see note 37.
51 Geier, note 4, at 128-29.
52 See generally § 451(a); Reg. § 1.451-1.
53 See Reg. § 1.451-1(a) (cash method taxpayers); Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S.
128 (1963) (accrual method taxpayers).
54 Auto. Club of Mich. v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957); Am. Auto Ass'n v. Com-
missioner, 367 U.S. 687 (1961); Schlude, 372 U.S. 128.
55 Geier, note 4, at 28.
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income. They also argued that it was inappropriate to require them to
treat such amounts as taxable income if they were precluded from
treating the amounts as income for financial accounting purposes.
The Supreme Court rejected these arguments. It acknowledged that
the matching of income and expense is a tax value,56 but declined to
permit deferral on that basis in the absence of a sufficiently determi-
nate showing of the future expenses. Rather, the Court concluded
that where the timing or amount of those expenses was uncertain, the
matching principle gave way to the Commissioner's determination
that deferral does not provide a "clear reflection of income," as re-
quired by § 446(b).
57
Because the Court seemed to accept the notion that matching of
income and expense, where possible, provides a more accurate mea-
sure of income than does their separate treatment, the trilogy left
open the possibility for an exception to the immediate inclusion rule
"where the time and extent of performance of future services ' 58 asso-
ciated with the advance payment are sufficiently certain. Artnell v.
Commissioner59 is one of a handful of cases that have acknowledged
the exception. The taxpayer in Artnell, the Chicago White Sox, de-
ferred the portion of season ticket revenues it received from season
ticket holders that were allocable to games to be played in the subse-
quent tax year. Because the taxpayer could associate the precise por-
tion of the prepayment to each game to be played, it was possible to
determine the extent to which any particular portion of the amount
received would represent profit or loss once the game was played.
The Seventh Circuit concluded that deferral in this circumstance did
not fail to clearly reflect income, and therefore that it was an abuse of
the Commissioner's discretion under § 446 to require current inclu-
sion. The court distinguished the Supreme Court trilogy on the basis
that the timing and amount of the associated services were less certain
in those cases, while the right to the payment was fixed.60 Other lower
56 Id. at 120 (stating that acceptance of the matching principle pervades the majorities'
and dissents' opinions in both Automobile Club of Michigan and Schlude).
57 That is, the receipt is taken as an accession to wealth the inclusion of which may be
deferred if the taxpayer can show that some of the wealth is phantom in the sense that
future expenditures will need to be made to earn it. Where the showing cannot be made
with sufficient certainty, the item is treated as current income. See Geier, note 4, at 118.
58 Artnell Co. v. Commissioner, 400 F.2d 981, 983-84 (7th Cir. 1968).
59 Id. at 981.
60 Id. at 983-84.
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courts occasionally have applied the Artnell rule, 61 although the rule is
generally construed narrowly.
62
A number of positions have been staked out in the literature on the
treatment of prepaid services income. Dodge and Klein each advance
a rule consistent with the rules they propose in the case of deposits:
For Klein, prepaid services income generally should be deferred, be-
cause it is not earned until the associated obligation has been dis-
charged. However the obligation is discharged-whether with future
services or a future cash payment-the recipient taxpayer has no in-
come on receipt. 63 For Dodge, the prepayment should be included on
receipt because he views the receipt of cash in the current period as an
accession to wealth that is not properly offset by an as-yet unrealized
obligation due in a future period.
64
Calvin Johnson advances an intermediate position. He would tax
prepayments on the basis of the presumptive source of cancellation of
the offsetting obligation.65 According to Johnson, the decisive differ-
ence between loan receipts or other kinds of refundable payments and
prepaid services income lies in the fact that prepaid services income,
though it is not owned free and clear in an economic sense, is ex-
pected to be discharged with services having zero basis to the service
provider. Thus there is no tax "cost" associated with satisfaction of
the recipient's obligation to the payor.66 From a tax perspective, it is
free. Loan proceeds and other kinds of refundable deposits, by con-
trast, presumptively will be repaid with after-tax amounts. For exam-
ple, if Borrower repays Lender with salary income received from
Employer, Borrower will pay tax on the salary income as earned, and
only after-tax proceeds will be remitted to Lender. Hence, the offset-
ting liability attaches to an amount in which Borrower will have basis.
61 See Collegiate Cap & Gown Co., 37 T.C.M. 960 (1978); Boise Cascade Corp. v.
United States, 530 F.2d 1367 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (upholding the taxpayer's consistently applied
rule of including payments for engineering services in income when the services were pro-
vided, which sometimes was before and sometimes was after payment, rather than on the
payment date). The Service has acquiesced in deferral in a wider array of cases, but only
for up to one year. See Rev. Proc. 71-21, 1971-2 C.B. 549 (permitting up to one year of
deferral for certain items of prepaid services income).
62 See Rev. Proc. 2004-34, 2004-22 I.R.B. 991, § 5.01 (current inclusion), § 5.02 (deferral
for up to one year if consistent with taxpayer's method of financial accounting).
63 Klein, note 3, at 1709-10 (noting that prepaid services income, loans, and deposits are
economic substitutes for one another).
64 Dodge, note 1, at 260-61.
65 Johnson, note 2, at 385.
66 Id. ("[L] gets no exclusion with respect to the $1 million cash receipt, because [L] has
no basis and will get no basis for the services."); see also id. at 408 ("For all objective
appearances, [L] is like someone who has just made a million dollars.... There is nothing
about [L]'s $1 million that makes it look like a loaned $1 million or distinguishes it from an
earned $1 million.").
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Geier offers yet another view. She argues that as in the deposit
case, the application of the matching principle to prepaid services in-
come represents a misguided attempt to import accounting values into
the income tax. The matching principle, which is a product of the ac-
counting profession's attempt to determine the real source and extent
of an enterprise's business health over the long term,67 "should not be
considered a value at all in a system that seeks to collect revenue, and
to do so based on 'income.'"68 In her view, instances of associating
income and expense items that one finds in the Code do not exemplify
a commitment to the matching principle but rather rest on other tax
values, such as ensuring that taxpayers do not take inappropriate ad-
vantage of loss positions or use noneconomic depreciation to shelter
ordinary compensation income. 69 The matching principle, while it
may have a place in the income tax, should give way to the extent it
conflicts with the principle of currently taxing amounts that represent
genuine income now.70 Geier refers to this principle as the "income
tax value."' 71 Thus, for example, she criticizes the Supreme Court's
willingness to defer to the Service's insistence on postponing recogni-
tion of future contingent liabilities72 but to permit the taxpayer to
override the Service's insistence where the future liability is fixed.
73
In her view, it is not the contingency of the future obligation that justi-
fies immediate inclusion but the fact that it is a future obligation-a
feature equally true of future fixed liabilities.74 Thus, neither fixed
nor contingent future liabilities associated with a current receipt
should entitle the taxpayer to defer inclusion.
To illustrate the point, Geier uses the example of a florist who is
paid $100,000 in Year 1 for flowers to be delivered in Year 16,75 at
which time the florist will incur $100,000 of expenses to deliver the
flowers under the contract. Failure to tax the $100,000 until Year 16 is
67 Geier, note 4, at 27-29 (noting that the objective of the matching principle is to associ-
ate revenue items with expenses that they entail so that the true economic benefit or cost
of the revenue is known).
68 Id. at 22.
69 Among the provisions she identifies are § 163(d) (investment interest rule), § 465 (at-
risk rules), § 469 (passive activity rules), and § 1092 (straddle rules). Geier, note 4, at 19.
70 Geier, note 4, at 91; see also Dodge, note 1, at 319-20 (rejecting the matching princi-
ple on similar grounds).
71 Geier, note 4, at 44.
72 See, e.g., Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182 (1934).
73 American Nat'l Co. v. United States, 274 U.S. 99 (1927).
74 Geier, note 4, at 91 ("Viewed from the perspective of the individual taxpayer, a cur-
rent deduction for a payment that will certainly be made but not until some point in the
future results in a violation of tax values.") (internal footnote omitted). The basis for the
Supreme Court's differing rules for fixed and contingent liabilities is that the contingency
of the liability brings the receipt under the claim of right doctrine. See North Am. Oil
Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
75 Geier, note 4, at 113-15.
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equivalent to providing a Year 1 deduction to the florist of $100,000,
which is to say it is equivalent to consumption tax treatment.76 The
size of the tax liability at issue can be illustrated by simple elaboration
on Geier's example. Suppose the discount rate at all times is 10%
compounded annually and the florist's marginal tax rate at all times is
30%. The present value of an obligation to pay $100,000 in sixteen
years is $33,873, assuming an after-tax rate of 7%. If the florist invests
the $100,000 in Year 1 at 7%, it will grow to $295,217 by Year 16, at
which time she will have a $100,000 liability, leaving her with $195,217
on an initial investment of $66,127. 77 In effect, the florist will be able
to invest $66,127 on a pretax basis. If she had been taxed properly on
the $66,127, she would have been left, instead, with $46,289, which
would have grown to $136,652 at 7%. She thus ends up with an addi-
tional $58,565 as a result of the failure to tax the $100,000 up front.
Preservation of the income tax value therefore requires current inclu-
sion of the $100,000.
Geier's point is well and good, but the problem she identifies is
proper application of time-value-of-money principles, not the match-
ing principle. In other words, the problem is not that the matching
principle permits deferral of the inclusion until the associated ex-
penses are incurred, but the deferral itself. Geier's example obscures
the issue by assuming that no profit arises apart from the fact that
payment occurs before the liability becomes due-that is, she stipulates
that the florist will incur $100,000 in expenses in Year 16 to satisfy her
contractual obligation. But suppose the florist would incur just
$90,000 of expenses to satisfy the obligation, so that if the contract
were completed in Year 1, she would clear $10,000 of taxable income.
Suppose further that the florist prepays the present value of $90,000 in
Year 1, or $30,486, but that she cannot account for the expense for tax
purposes until Year 16, when the $100,000 will be included. Now in-
come and expense occur in the same year, but both are deferred. The
analysis does not change: The florist still has the benefit of the net
profit to which she would have been entitled, but she has received it
fifteen years early.78 The timing of the expenses is not relevant. The
question is when the income is earned.
76 See E. Cary Brown, Business-Income Taxation and Investment Incentives, in Income,
Employment and Public Policy: Essays in Honor of Alvin H. Hansen (1948), discussed in
Geier, note 4, at 42-43.
77 That amount is what is left of the $100,000 the florist receives in Year 1 after she sets
aside enough to pay the $100,000 liability in Year 16. The florist also would have a $30,000
tax liability on inclusion of the $100,000 in income, but it would be offset by the $100,000 of
expense in supplying the flowers.
78 The florist has $69,514.30 that she can invest at 7% on an after-tax basis. In Year 16
she would have $191,792. At that time she records both the $100,000 inclusion and the
$90,000 expense, leaving $101,792 after taxes.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
(Vol. 61:
THE TAX TREATMENT OF ADVANCE RECEIPTS
Application of ordinary substance over form principles would elimi-
nate the abuse Geier identifies, because it would address the inclusion
side of the ledger. A customer's payment of $100,000 today for flow-
ers that will cost $100,000 in sixteen years can only be understood as
two separate transactions, inasmuch as the present value of a right to
receive $100,000 in fifteen years under these assumptions is just
$33,873 (on an after-tax basis), and parties dealing at arm's length do
not give value for nothing. The proper tax analysis, before one gets to
the question of whether to include the advance receipt in income or
not, is therefore to determine why the purchaser would give an addi-
tional $66,127 for the florist's services. 79 Whatever the reason, the ad-
vance receipt is the $33,873 difference between the $100,000 paid and
the additional amount, which should be characterized and taxed ac-
cording to its substance. 80 If the advance receipt portion is deferred,
the florist receives the benefits of interest income without having paid
tax on the invested amount. Of course, the florist also has an offset-
ting obligation to furnish $100,000 of services fifteen years down the
road. The arrangement is functionally indistinguishable from an origi-
nal issue discount (OLD) debt instrument issued by the florist to the
customer.81 The only difference is that payment is in goods and ser-
vices rather than money. Like any borrower, the issuer of an OID
debt instrument does not include the amount received in income. The
difference from an ordinary debt instrument is that unpaid interest is
treated as accruing during the life of the loan, and the parties are
taxed accordingly.
C. Loans
1. The Offsetting Obligation Theory
As a general matter, no income arises for the borrower on receipt of
loan proceeds, and no deduction is available on repayment of princi-
pal.82 (Hereinafter, I refer to this treatment as the "accrual model.")
79 See, e.g., Custom Chrome v. Commissioner, 217 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2000), in which
the court required the taxpayer to bifurcate payment received for a loan together with an
option in order to determine the proper tax consequences of the transaction.
80 As examples, the payment may be compensation income, a dividend, or a gift. See
IRC § 7872, discussed in Part III below.
81 The rules for OlD debt instruments are set forth at §§ 1272-1275. Simplifying greatly,
they generally require that the lender and the borrower account for the discount over the
life of the OlD debt instrument. The discount is treated as interest and is generally deduct-
ible to the borrower under § 163 and includible by the lender under § 1272, in each case
without regard to when interest is actually paid.
82 See Glen Arlen Kohl, The Identification Theory of Basis, 40 Tax L. Rev. 623, 634
(1985) ("Borrowing money at a market rate of interest does not constitute receipt of gross
income.").
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Similarly, the lender has no deduction or inclusion on the transfer or
the later return, respectively, of principal. Interest generally is taxa-
ble8 3 on receipt or when earned and, if it is paid in connection with the
conduct of a trade or business or for the production of income, de-
ductible by the payor.8 4 When amounts originally disregarded under
this regime are subsequently determined by the lender to be uncol-
lectible, the borrower usually has income from the discharge of in-
debtedness,85 subject to possible limitation if the debtor is insolvent,8 6
while the lender typically has a bad debt deduction.
87
The traditional justification for the accrual model has been the off-
setting obligation theory. Under this theory, no tax arises on receipt
of loan proceeds because the borrower is considered to be no wealth-
ier by reason of the receipt of the proceeds than she was before she
entered into the loan transaction. Because the burden of the obliga-
tion to repay precisely offsets the value of the outstanding principal
amount, the loan transaction is viewed as an economic wash. 88 More-
over, as principal is repaid, a pro tanto reduction in the size of the
benefit of the previous receipt occurs, so that at all times the net value
of the loan proceeds plus the obligation is zero. Similarly, the lender
has no deduction on payout of the loan proceeds because the bor-
rower's note is an asset of equal value exchanged therefor. It is a
straightforward exchange of value for value .9
The accrual model has many virtues, not least of which is its simplic-
ity: The acts of borrowing and repayment of principal can be disre-
garded for income tax purposes. It also is not necessary to account for
loans depending on whether the principal amount is contingent for
some portion of the life of the loan, or on whether the loan is business
or personal in nature.90 Moreover, the accrual model is compatible
with the principal purpose of most loan transactions, which is to ac-
quire liquidity. Viewing borrowing as a purchase of liquidity, the ac-
crual model keeps the income tax from working at cross purposes to
the loan because the act of borrowing does not itself create liquidity-
83 IRC § 61(a)(4).
84 IRC § 163(a). If the interest is paid in connection with the production of income but
not in connection with the conduct of a trade or business of the taxpayer, the deduction
may be subject to phase-out, see IRC § 68(a), and to the limits on deduction for investment
interest. IRC § 163(d).
85 IRC § 61(a)(12).
86 IRC § 108(a).
87 IRC § 166.
88 See Johnson, note 2, at 384; Klein, note 3, at 1691; Kohl, note 82, at 634; see also
Dodge, note 1, at 253-54 (stating but not agreeing with the theory).
89 See IRC § 1001; Reg. § 1.1001-3. Note that Dodge agrees with this principle. Dodge,
note 1, at 258-59.
90 The points raised here do not apply to interest, the deductibility of which depends on
a variety of factors.
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impairing tax liabilities. Hence, liquidity is more readily available
than it would be under the cash flow model, which would tax the pro-
ceeds on receipt and provide a deduction on repayment. 91 Finally,
there appears to be a reasonable logical basis for treating the proceeds
of borrowing differently from unrestricted receipts. It seems correct
to say that a taxpayer in receipt of an item that comes with a corre-
sponding liability does not enjoy the same accession to wealth that
someone does who receives the item free and clear.
2. Dodge's Criticisms of the Offsetting Obligation Theory
Although the accrual model is well established and widely accepted
among tax scholars as legally correct (at least for true market-rate
loans), 92 Dodge recently has argued that the accrual model is incorrect
under a realization-based income tax such as ours.93 He claims, in the
first place, that the offsetting obligation theory is inconsistent with the
tax treatment of other kinds of advance receipts also associated with
offsetting future obligations already discussed, such as prepaid ser-
vices income. Second, he notes that it is similarly in tension with the
denial of a deduction for future liabilities, even if they are fixed in
amount, until no earlier than the time the taxpayer pays for (or, in the
case of accrual method taxpayers, bears the real economic burden
of)9 4 the liability. In this connection he observes that these rules gen-
erally are not considered inappropriate, and indeed contrary rules
would tend to invite arrangements that most would regard as abusive.
For example, it appears that if taxpayers could defer inclusion of pre-
paid services income until economic performance occurred, then
91 One would expect market effects to compensate, at least in part, for the added cost of
borrowing if loan principal were taxable on receipt. If the transfer of loan proceeds were,
correspondingly, deductible to the lender, interest rates would be expected to drop by the
precise amount necessary to enable borrowers to borrow enough more than they do cur-
rently to cover the tax liability associated with the loan receipt, setting aside differences in
marginal rates, limitations on losses, and other ancillary issues. If, however, no deduction
were available to the lender (as seems correct from an income standpoint), one would
expect the economic incidence of the tax burden associated with receipt to be divided
between borrowers and lenders. See e.g., Bradley J. Ruffly, Tax and Subsidy Incidence
Equivalence Theories: Experimental Evidence from Competitive Markets, 89 J. Pub.
Econ. 1519, 1525 (2005). Concomitantly, a tax advantage to equity financing would result
in an overall decline in debt financing. See Klein, note 3, at 1711 (noting distortions arising
from inaccurate tax rules). Whether the shift toward equity financing would represent the
introduction of a distortion or a correction of a pre-existing one depends on one's view of
the appropriate baseline against which to measure the distortion.
92 For example, Geier, Johnson, and Klein all accept the borrowing exclusion as correct.
93 Dodge, note 1, at 323.
94 See IRC § 461(h) (requiring "economic performance" associated with an otherwise
accrued liability to have taken place before the liability is deductible by an accrual method
taxpayer).
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through the expedient of prepaid employment contracts they could
reduce the real burden of their tax liabilities while enjoying the eco-
nomic benefit of the associated receipts. Similarly, the ability of ac-
crual method taxpayers to deduct the full amount of an accrued but
unpaid liability would permit them to deduct the face amount of a
liability, the true value of which would be its discounted present value.
This perceived abuse led Congress to enact § 461(h), which precludes
any deduction for such liabilities until the economic performance as-
sociated with the liability takes place. 95
Third, and most significantly, Dodge argues that most forms of bor-
rowing should be taxable on receipt and deductible on repayment, be-
cause the receipt of loan proceeds represents a real accession to
wealth that is not matched by an offsetting liability under a realiza-
tion-based income tax. Although the liability is real, Dodge argues
that it should not be accounted for until the period in which it actually
becomes due. 96 Prior to that period, it is appropriate to leave the tax
liability out of the tax base, just as unrealized gains and losses on the
asset side of the ledger are omitted from the tax base.97
Dodge argues that the result would seem to follow under the Haig-
Simons conception of income that is widely accepted as the normative
benchmark for the actual income tax.98 Haig-Simons income is de-
fined as the net increase in wealth (including values spent on con-
sumption) during the relevant tax period.99 When the repayment
obligation arises in a period later than the period in which receipt oc-
curs, it would seem that the obligor on the loan has income to the full
extent of the receipt, because the realization rule precludes taking cur-
rent account of any reduction in her wealth during the period by rea-
son of the future obligation.100 If Borrower receives $100,000 in Year
1 in exchange for her note to Lender, payable in full in Year 10 with
95 See H.R. Rep. No. 98-432, pt. 2, at 1254-55 (1984); see also Martin J. McMahon, Jr.,
Reforming Cost Recovery Allowances for Debt Financed Depreciable Property, 29 St.
Louis U. L.J. 1029 (1985). Note, however, a more accurate remedy than adoption of the
economic performance test would have been to require discounting of the amount of the
deduction to its present value. See, e.g., Geier, note 4, at 101 (noting that § 461(h) is a
compromise provision).
96 Dodge, note 1, at 263-65.
97 See IRC § 1001 (tax is applied to gain or loss realized on sale or other disposition of
property). There are some exceptions to the realization rule, but these are relatively nar-
row. See IRC § 475 (dealers in securities), § 1256 (certain forward, futures, and option
contracts).
98 Dodge, note 1, at 248-49.
99 Henry Simons, The Concept of Income 50 (1938).
100 "[T]he earliest time that a decrease in wealth can be said to occur is the date pay-
ment is due, that being the earliest time that the creditor has the right (and possibly the
power) to cause the debtor's existing stock of wealth (if any) to be reduced, as well as
being the earliest date on which interest can commence to run." Dodge, note 1, at 256-57.
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adequate stated interest prior thereto, then Borrower appears to have
$100,000 income in Year 1 because of the loan. According to Dodge,
the obligation to repay, while real, does not have any impact on Bor-
rower in Year 1. Rather the impact occurs in the period or periods in
which the loan becomes due, just as the recipient of prepaid income
for services typically has income on receipt even though she has an
obligation to provide the services in a future period.
Moreover, Dodge denies that the fact that a lender has no deduc-
tion on extension of the loan requires noninclusion by the borrower.
He claims that while future repayment obligations are generally irrele-
vant to the measurement of income in the current period, repayment
rights, because they are typically salable, represent an asset the value
of which is approximately equal to the cash the lender surrenders on
the loan.10' It follows that on his view, the proper treatment of loan
proceeds would effectively result in the creation of income as a result
of the extension of the loan: No loss to the lender, but inclusion in
income to the borrower at that time. Reconciliation occurs as the loan
is repaid, at which time the borrower has a deduction but there is no
corresponding inclusion to the lender.
D. Claim of Right
The final receipt examined here arises under the doctrine of claim
of right, which I discuss by way of comparison to the typical advance
receipt case. Like advance receipt cases, the claim of right doctrine
applies to amounts that may or may not turn out to be income to the
recipient, but unlike advance receipt cases, in many instances the
claim of right relates to an item that is clearly income of someone at
the time it is paid; the uncertainty relates to the identity of the
owner. 10 2 Hence the cases in which the doctrine applies may differ in
important but illustrative ways from the typical advance receipt case.
First articulated by the Supreme Court in North American Consoli-
dated Oil Co. v. Burnet'0 3, the doctrine covers the receipt of payments
the ultimate disposition of which is subject to uncertainty. North
American involved underlying litigation between the taxpayer and the
federal government over beneficial ownership of oil-producing land
during 1916 and of the profits from the land earned in that year. A
receiver was appointed to hold the profits during the pendency of the
101 Id. at 258-59.
102 This is not always the case. In some claim of right cases the issue has been framed as
one of timing-when is the amount income? See, e.g., Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S.
128 (1963) (characterizing prepayments for dance lessons as income on receipt under a
claim of right).
103 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
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litigation. In 1917, the trial court decided for the taxpayer and the
receiver distributed the 1916 profits to it. The federal government ap-
pealed, 0 4 and the Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the decision in
1922.105
The tax case involved the question of when North American had to
include the 1916 profits in income. In an amended return for 1916, the
company included the amounts in that year. The government deter-
mined on audit that the proper year was 1917, when the receiver
turned over the 1916 profits to the company. Before the courts, the
company argued that the proper year to report the income was 1922,
the year in which the litigation was finally terminated. It also argued
that if 1922 was not the proper year, 1916 was since that was the year
the income was earned. The Court ruled in favor of the government.
"If a taxpayer receives earnings under a claim of right and without
restriction as to its disposition, he has received income which he is
required to return, even though it may still be claimed that he is not
entitled to retain the money, and even though he may still be ad-
judged liable to restore its equivalent."'01 6 The Court noted that had
the taxpayer lost the underlying litigation, it would have been entitled
to a deduction in 1922.
Like the rules for loan proceeds and advance deposits, the claim of
right rule has been criticized as incorrect or, even if correct, as based
on faulty reasoning. Recognizing the practical virtue of the all-or-
nothing rule for items received under a claim of right, Klein argues
that the theoretically correct rule would discount the inclusion by the
probability of its return. 10 7 Dodge argues that the only way to make
sense of the claim of right rule, with which he presumably agrees, is to
regard the repayment obligation as contingent because it is incapable
of valuation and so as not "realized.' 1 8 As I argue below, a claim of
right, where it does not involve an offsetting deduction or loss to an-
other party, technically presents a different question from the pure
advance receipt case. Unlike an advance receipt, such an amount rep-
resents a current income item to someone; the only question is
whom.109 The rule that the Court articulated in North American is
that the recipient is the presumptive owner of the income.
104 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, 264 F. 336 (9th Cir. 1920).
105 258 U.S. 633 (1922).
106 North American, 286 U.S. at 424.
107 Klein, note 3, at 1689-91.
108 Dodge, note 1, at 277 (agreeing that the repayment obligation is not realized because
it has not occurred in the present period); see also Geier, note 4, at 119-20 (suggesting that
the claim of right doctrine masks the real problem in advance payments, which is failure to
account for the time value of money).
109 This is not always the case. A claim of right may apply to an item already taxed to
someone, with the question being whether the recipient under the claim of right or another
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The difference between such a case and the advance receipt case is
that under a claim of right the question does not involve the treatment
of an as-yet unrealized future income item or an expected income
item, but rather who should be taxed on an item that should be regis-
tered by the system as a genuine increase in wealth now.110 This dif-
ference necessitates a different conceptual (though not necessarily
practical) approach from that for advance receipts. In the advance
receipt context, typically no income item exists on payment; it is
earned later. In the claim of right context, the income may exist on
payment, even though it is unclear whose income it is. The tax stakes
for the government are much greater in the latter case than in the
former, because the failure to identify a tax owner results in current
income that goes untaxed until a future period.
E. Conclusion on the Taxation of Advance Receipts
The preceding discussion suggests that not merely disagreement but
confusion reigns in the tax analysis of advance receipts. In many
cases, courts and commentators have focused on questions of con-
trol, " ' likelihood of retention,1 2 or source of the satisfaction of an
obligation as a basis for taxing advance receipts. 113 In others, they
have focused on the fact of an offsetting obligation or unripened de-
ductions as a basis for nontaxation, without regard to the source or
even the contingency of the obligation or the deduction. 1 4 The prob-
lem is that the lines that these rules draw are mutually inconsistent. If
the fact of an offsetting obligation is sufficient to defer tax, then pre-
paid services income should not be included in income; currently it is
except in narrow circumstances. If the fact of an offsetting obligation
is insufficient to defer tax, then not only the receipt of loan proceeds
but also the transfer of rental property should trigger tax to the recipi-
should be taxed on it. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951) (excess bonus
repaid).
110 In this regard, the simplification that the claim of right doctrine effects-assigning all
the income to one of two (or more) logically possible parties-is similar to the simplification
that treats the borrower under a nonrecourse debt obligation as the tax owner of the fi-
nanced property. Conceptually, nonrecourse debt operates like a put option. A put option
splits the risks of ownership between the option holder and the option writer. The division
of ownership attributes fluctuate continuously over time as the probability that the option
will be exercised fluctuates. See Daniel Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules and the Taxation of
Capital Income, 50 Tax L. Rev. 643, 659-60 (1995).
nM See, e.g., New Capital Hotel, Inc. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 706 (1957) (taxpayer's
control over prepayment resulted in inclusion for tax purposes).
112 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 372 U.S. 203, 210 (1990)
("The key is whether the taxpayer has some guarantee that he will be allowed to keep the
money.").
113 Johnson, note 2, at 403.
114 See, e.g., Beacon Publishing v. United States, 218 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1955).
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ent; currently neither is included in income. If the contingency of a
future obligation is the sine qua non of inclusion of a current receipt,
then fixed future liabilities should be available to offset a current re-
ceipt, whether or not the receipt is a loan or payment for future ser-
vices, and contingent payment loans should be taxable until the
amount of the liability is fixed. Neither is the operative rule.
115 If
control over the advance receipt suffices as a basis to tax, then, again,
all advance receipts should be taxable currently. Moreover, if control
is both necessary and sufficient, one could argue that the size of the
inclusion depends on the extent of control over the funds received.
For example, many commercial loans are subject to substantial restric-
tions on the use of the proceeds. Where the restrictions are put in
place as a result of negotiations with the lender, the borrower's con-
trol is reduced and, it would seem, the control analysis would require
a discount to the size of the loan inclusion.
A further problem is that consistent application of any one of the
theories advanced seems to generate unacceptable results in some
cases. At the most general level, it does not seem appropriate that
advance receipts all should be either includible or not includible. Nor
does it seem that the existence or not of a contingency on future re-
payment tells us whether or not the recipient has income to the extent
of the receipt, given the equally powerful intuition that a person in
receipt of an amount subject to even a contingent repayment obliga-
tion seems less wealthy than a person who receives a like amount free
and clear. Similarly, it is not clear why taxation should depend on
whether a repayment obligation happens to fall within or outside of an
arbitrarily defined period.
These inconsistencies suggest that an exclusive focus on the concept
of income as a basis for the existing rules is unsatisfactory as both an
explanatory and a normative matter. The following Part focuses more
narrowly on the concept of income in order to provide a basis for
understanding what rules would emerge if the tax system really tried
to tax income from advance receipts as it arises. Part IV then explains
why it is sometimes appropriate to depart from the income concept
for taxing advance receipts even in a system that seeks to tax income.
III. WHEN INCOME ARISES
The approaches previously discussed all seek to formulate a rule for
the taxation of advance receipts that reflects an effort to tax real in-
come, or to approximate the taxation of real income, under the in-
115 The rules for contingent payment debt instruments are set forth in Reg. § 1.1275-4.
They do not generally require inclusion of loan proceeds on such instruments.
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come tax. This Part explains why these efforts are misguided. As I
argue, from a theoretical perspective, advance receipts generally
would become taxable only as and when they are secured to the tax-
payer without an offsetting obligation. Prior to that time, advance re-
ceipts reflect in economic terms either a shift of funds that is
compensated for by interest or, if it is not so compensated, a separate
arrangement such as a current gift or current compensation. Further,
whether deductions associated with income that the advance receipt
may or may not become have ripened is irrelevant to the analysis.
The matching principle is a red herring. Similarly, the transfer of con-
trol or the use of an advance receipt to fund consumption rather than
a business expenditure is immaterial.
Section A analyzes advance receipts from this theoretical perspec-
tive. Section B focuses on the effects that implicit interest in certain
advance receipt cases has on the analysis.
A. Timing of Income Under the Haig-Simons Definition
Henry Simons famously defined personal income as "the algebraic
sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2)
the change in the value of the store of property rights between the
beginning and end of the period in question,"'116 or: I = AW + C,
where I represents income, AW change in wealth, and C amounts
spent on consumption, all during the relevant tax period. Thus, an
individual who earns $40,000 in wages, receives $9,000 in interest in-
come, and spends $15,000 on consumed items has $49,000 of income
during the tax period. It consists of a $34,000 net change in wealth
($40,000 + $9,000 - $15,000) and $15,000 spent on consumption.
Under this definition, all accessions to wealth, regardless of whether
they result from earnings, gifts, capital gains, windfalls, or other
sources, constitute income.
What of an individual who receives a payment subject to an offset-
ting obligation of some sort? In the case of loans, it generally is be-
lieved that no income arises for the borrower on receipt of loan
proceeds, and no deduction is available on repayment of principal,
assuming that the obligation carries a market rate of interest. 117 Simi-
larly, the lender has no deduction or inclusion, respectively, on the
transfer or the later return of principal. As previously discussed, the
reason that typically is advanced (and that appears to have been ac-
cepted by Simons) is that the obligation to repay offsets the increase
116 Simons, note 99, at 50.
117 See Kohl, note 82, at 634 ("Borrowing money at a market rate of interest does not
constitute receipt of gross income.").
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in wealth that the receipt reflects, assuming a market rate of interest is
charged on the receipt.
118
Less clear are the cases of other kinds of offsetting obligations, dis-
cussed in the preceding Part. As indicated, commentators have vari-
ously viewed the facts that the offsetting obligation can be satisfied by
an exchange (rather than a "return"), that the obligation is contingent,
that the obligation is incurred at a discount, or that the obligation may
be satisfied with "pretax" amounts, as reasons for distinguishing be-
tween loan treatment and current taxation. Moreover, Dodge sug-
gests that the Haig-Simons theory itself supports current inclusion of
loan proceeds in the case of a realization-based income tax, without
regard to the nature of the offsetting obligation, because the obliga-
tion arises in a future period.119
As a general matter, the notions that other kinds of advance re-
ceipts merit treatment that differs from loan treatment, or that loans
themselves should be included in income under a realization-based
income tax, are mistaken. They reflect three sorts of confusion. First,
they may rely on the exigencies of tax administration rather than on
any coherent concept of income to determine whether current pay-
ments should or should not be included in gross income. Second, they
may rest on the mistaken notion that because the propriety of match-
ing for accounting purposes does not imply its propriety for tax pur-
poses, the deferral that would apply under the matching rule for
financial accounting purposes also should not apply for tax accounting
purposes. Third, commentators' analyses may be informed by con-
cepts such as control over or dissipation of the receipt, or personal
versus business use, rather than that of accession to wealth. Control,
dissipation, and the use to which proceeds are put are relevant to a
cash flow tax analysis of prepayments, typically associated with a con-
sumption or a wealth tax, not to an income tax analysis. Focusing on
the crux of the Haig-Simons concept, the question is whether the re-
ceipt of the advance payment represents an accession to wealth-that
is, a genuine increase in wealth, either because the total store of rights
has increased, or because another has suffered a genuine loss in rights
(as when a loan becomes uncollectible). As argued below, where the
advance payment is subject to an offsetting obligation of equal value
11s Simons does not appear ever to have formally set forth his views on the proper tax
treatment of loan proceeds. Commentators, however, generally have assumed that Simons
agreed with the standard approach, possibly taking his silence as assent to it. See, e.g.,
Reed Shuldiner, A General Approach to the Taxation of Financial Instruments, 71 Tex. L.
Rev. 243, 296 n.232 (1992) (quoting and agreeing with the statement of Michael J. Graetz,
Federal Income Taxation: Principles and Policies 216 (2d ed. 1988), that "In Henry
Simons' terms, [in a loan] there is no change in the net worth of either party .
119 Dodge, note 1, at 263-65.
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(taking into account time value of money principles), the answer to
this question must be "no."
The discussion below begins with the analysis of a basic loan trans-
action, demonstrating why it is incorrect to view the receipt of loan
proceeds as an accession to wealth. Having established this proposi-
tion, the argument then demonstrates that other kinds of advance re-
ceipts are not meaningfully different from loans in conceptual terms.
It is important to bear in mind that throughout the discussion, the
focus remains on the conceptual underpinnings of advance receipts,
and therefore on the tax rules that ought to apply under a pure in-
come tax in which practical considerations play no role. The appropri-
ate rules in the second-best world of the actual tax system differ.
1. Basic Analysis-Simple Loans
In a basic arm's length loan transaction, the borrower receives loan
proceeds in exchange for (1) a promise to repay the proceeds at some
future date or dates and (2) a promise to make interest payments on
the outstanding principal amounts. 120 Although the nontaxation of
the receipt of loan proceeds is widely accepted as "correct," its impli-
cations have not always been well understood. 121 It is critical to artic-
ulate the conceptual support for the result, because the treatment of
advance receipts generally hinges on the same basic analysis.
There are at least three ways to illustrate the point that extension of
a loan made between parties dealing at arm's length does not result in
income to the borrower under the Haig-Simons concept.12 2 First, on
an intuitive level one can say that two individuals, A and B, each in
receipt of $X on Day 1 but only one of whom, A, must return $X two
years in the future and pay adequate interest in the interim, do not
have equal incomes. Each has disposition over cash, but the person
who receives the $X free and clear enjoys an accession to wealth that
the obligated person does not. Put bluntly, it matters whether you are
A or B. 123
120 Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940).
121 See Klein, note 3, at 1691 (noting that the loan proceeds rule has been taken as "self-
evidently correct" but appears inconsistent with the equally well settled rule that advance
rent is taxable on receipt).
122 The notion that parties dealing at arm's length exchange value for value has been
described as a "rule" of the income tax. See, e.g., Theodore P. Seto, The Function of the
Discharge of Indebtedness Doctrine: Complete Accounting in the Federal Income Tax
System, 51 Tax L. Rev. 199, 220 (1996), but it is more properly viewed as axiomatic. Any
other rule would be inconsistent with the assumption that parties operate within a market.
123 See Charlotte Crane, Loan Proceeds as Income: A Response to Professor Dodge, 27
Va. Tax. Rev. 563, 566 (2008) (noting the same distinction).
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One might object that while A is worse off than B, she is surely
better off than C, who never receives $X in the first place and there-
fore has no loan repayment obligation. This objection, however, illus-
trates the second and more important point. The fact that in an arm's
length arrangement the obligor must pay adequate interest while $X is
in her possession demonstrates that she has exchanged value for
value. Put otherwise, if parties are dealing at arm's length, C does not
exist unless C also pays a market rate of interest on the $X. The value
that a genuine borrower receives is liquidity, and her purchase of it
with interest is no different from a person's purchase of any other
commodity. If A need not pay interest, then she has received value,
not because of the receipt itself, but because of the right to use the
money for free. That value is not, of course, $X, but the cost of its use
during the loan term, or the interest on $X over two years. 124 The
appropriate way to tax A is to tax her on that cost. Disregarding the
obligation to pay interest, how much wealth the borrower would be
thought to receive would depend on how long she was entitled to hold
the proceeds. That is, setting aside any offsetting interest obligation,
one might concede that the receipt of loan proceeds does not enrich
one to the same extent as the receipt of the proceeds free and clear,
but one also might argue that one who receives a loan subject solely to
an obligation to repay is better off than one who receives nothing at
all. The extent of the wealth received then would depend on the
amount of time the recipient was entitled to hold the proceeds before
repayment. If the proceeds must be returned shortly, the wealth ac-
cession is minimal. If for longer, it is greater. At the limit of zero, the
receipt is worthless; at the other end of the spectrum, the receipt is
worth its face amount. But the interest owed on the receipt is propor-
tional to the time the receipt is held. Inasmuch as the exchange occurs
at arm's length, the value the borrower receives in obtaining the loan
proceeds is exactly equal to the interest she must pay for the right to
hold the funds.
Therefore, to the extent the obligor in an arm's length arrangement
prefers (1) to receive the proceeds in exchange for the obligations to
return them in the future and to pay interest in the interim, over (2)
no advance receipt and no interest obligation, she enjoys nothing
124 As an alternative, A could be viewed as having received two items: a current, taxable
transfer (assuming it is not otherwise exempt from tax) of the difference between $X and
its present value in two years, and a loan of that present value. Compare IRC § 7872(a)
(providing for treatment described in the text for certain below-market loans), and
§ 7872(b) (providing for discounted present value treatment).
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more than consumer surplus-that is, an ordinary gain from trade.125
The liquidity she purchases with her interest payments is worth more
to her than the amount it costs. Of course, the same is true of a fac-
tory owner who purchases a machine for use in her business or an
individual who purchases a ticket to a movie she is particularly keen
on seeing, but in neither case has the excess of the value to the pur-
chaser over its cost ever been subject to tax under the income tax.
126
In short, the excess of the reservation price of the liquidity to the bor-
rower over its cost is no different from the excess value that a patron
in a restaurant gets from an exceptionally good meal or a factory
owner gets from the purchase of factory machinery. It is not taxable.
Further, there is no reason to assume that the amount of consumer
surplus equals the advance receipt amount.
127
Third, it is impossible to make sense of the claim that the borrower
has income on receipt by reason of a value shift, given, as must be the
case under the income tax, that the lender does not have an economic
loss. The lender, of course, acquires an asset-the borrower's obliga-
tions to repay and to pay interest-in exchange for the proceeds. The
notion that the lender has not suffered an economic loss in an arm's
length exchange of value for value is basic to the income tax, and in-
deed to any tax system that purports to apply to a system of voluntary
exchange among typically self-interested parties. 128 In a free ex-
change, no economic loss arises, because individuals do not volunta-
rily incur losses. To dispense with the notion that the transaction
creates no loss for the lender is to assume that individuals voluntarily
part with economic value. Consequently, taxation of the borrower on
an advance receipt would entail the presupposition that wealth has
125 One might argue that a borrower's relative creditworthiness results in an inclusion or
a deduction to the extent her cost of funds differs from some benchmark rate. I disregard
this issue here.
126 The factory owner will be subject to tax, if at all, on sale of the goods produced with
the machine. By contrast, the surplus enjoyed by the moviegoer remains untaxed.
127 Indeed, standard economic theory holds that any individual's consumer surplus will
vary from person to person, because different individuals may value the same goods differ-
ently. See Joseph Mayer, Consumer's Surplus, 16 Am. Econ. Rev. 77, 78-79 (1926), for an
early statement of this point.
128 All commentators seem to acknowledge this. See Dodge, note 1, at 255; Geier, note
4, at 42-43; Johnson, note 2, at 384; Klein, note 3, at 1710. Note that at the cited text,
Johnson distinguishes receipt of loan proceeds from prepayment of future services on the
basis that the prepayment "can be expected to increase [the payee's] present value net
worth by [the amount of the expected profit]." Johnson, note 2, at 384 (emphasis added).
The word "expected" demonstrates that what is being subject to tax in the prepayment
case is likely or expected income that does not yet exist, not actual income. The payee has
not yet provided the services that will produce the profit. See Part III. Contrast a con-
sumption tax, under which the payor would have a deduction. See, e.g., Mitchell L. Engler
& Michael S. Knoll, Simplifying the Transition to a (Progressive) Consumption Tax, 56
SMU L. Rev. 53 (2003).
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been created to the extent of the transfer merely by the fact of the
transfer, because the borrower is deemed to be enriched but the
lender suffers no loss. To state the proposition is to refute it.129
To be sure, where the transaction is not at arm's length or involves a
separate relationship, such as a gift or a low-interest loan between an
employer and an employee to provide compensation, an advance pay-
ment may result in a net transfer of value in the form of understated
(or overstated) interest. This problem is distinct from the treatment
of the advance receipt itself. To the extent the arrangement involves a
genuine exchange of value for value, the offsetting obligation analysis
is as apt in these cases as it is in an arm's length loan. To the extent
the arrangement involves underpayment (or overpayment) in the
form of inadequate (or excessive) interest, separate treatment of the
deficit or excess is required. As a general matter, current law provides
for such treatment. 130 More to the point, a true income tax would
always identify both this separate element, be it compensation, a gift,
or something else, and any disguised interest component and tax each
accordingly.
2. Dodge's Realization Rule Counterargument
Dodge offers a novel criticism of this basic analysis. Conceding that
a true Haig-Simons income tax would prevent inclusion of loan pro-
ceeds in income on receipt, Dodge argues that under the current reali-
zation-based system, it is inappropriate to take obligations into
account prior to the period in which they are payable. 3 1 The reason
is that the realization rule generally provides that gains and losses are
not taken into account for tax purposes until there is some sort of
disposition, or severance, of property or services from the taxpayer.
132
129 Note that the argument here is distinct from the claim that the exchange of cash for
the borrower's note generates income to the borrower because she tacks basis in the note.
This claim is discussed in Subsection III.A.2.v.
130 See, e.g., IRC § 483 (certain property sales), § 1274 (certain publicly traded debt in-
struments), § 7872 (below-market loans).
131 Dodge, note 1, at 260-65.
132 The Code does not incorporate an explicit realization requirement, but it does pre-
suppose that gains and losses generally will be accounted for on realization, and not before.
See IRC § 1001(a) (taxable gain on disposition of property equals the difference between
the amount realized and the taxpayer's adjusted basis in the property). In particular, the
numerous nonrecognition provisions can only be understood against the backdrop of a
general realization requirement. See, e.g., IRC § 351 (contribution of property to a con-
trolled corporation), § 361 (exchange of stock for stock in certain reorganizations), § 721
(contribution of property to a partnership), § 1031 (exchange or properties of like kind).
The same is true for the comparatively fewer provisions that expressly provide for gain or
loss recognition in the absence of realization. IRC § 471 (accrual accounting for inven-
tory), § 475 (securities held by dealers), § 1256 (certain forward, futures, and option
contracts).
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Prior to that time, accrued gains and losses are disregarded. Thus, in
contrast to a pure accretion income tax, the actual tax system does not
require that market appreciation or depreciation of property be taken
into account on an ongoing basis; rather such gains and losses are ac-
counted for only on disposition of the property, at which time a "true-
up" occurs.
In support of his position, Dodge observes that under the actual tax
system "accretion taxation occupies a small island in a realization
ocean. ' 133 Since the few items that are accounted for on a true accre-
tion basis are done so for narrow policy reasons,134 it does not appear
obvious why loans should be counted among them. Therefore, as ap-
plied to liabilities, the actual income tax would seem to require their
exclusion from the tax base prior to the period in which they are paya-
ble, in just the manner that built-in gain and loss on the asset side of
the ledger are disregarded prior to disposition. Under this theory, a
currently realized advance receipt should not be offset by a future lia-
bility if the liability will not be payable until a future period. Hence,
the recipient of a loan would be treated as acceding to the full loan
value at the time of receipt, except to the extent that repayment of
principal was required in the current period. In future periods, the
borrower would be entitled to a deduction as and when the principal
was repaid.1
35
There are several difficulties with Dodge's argument. In the first
place, the notion that no offsetting liability currently exists in the case
of a standard loan is incorrect. Consider an on-market loan arrange-
ment. Failure to make interest payments (or, for that matter, principal
payments) generally results in acceleration of the loan. 136 More to the
point, the analysis remains essentially the same even if failure to make
(some) interest payments simply triggers a larger interest payment ob-
ligation rather than repayment of the loan. Ultimately the borrower
pays for the loan proceeds on an ongoing basis. That is precisely what
interest is-the cost of the use of funds.' 37 Hence, the realization event
is payment of interest. In economic terms, the loan is a series of pay-
ments made for the use of money.
Dodge hopes to avoid this conclusion by distinguishing between the
receipt of the money and its use. Interest pays for the latter, but not
133 Dodge, note 1, at 265.
134 See note 132.
135 Dodge, note 1, at 265-66.
136 See, e.g., R. Wilson Freyermuth, Enforcement of Acceleration Provisions and the
Rhetoric of Good Faith, 1998 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1035, 1035 ("Today, virtually all mortgages
contain acceleration clauses permitting the mortgagee to accelerate the mortgage indebt-
edness upon default by the mortgagor as defined in the mortgage loan documentation.").
137 Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488, 498 (1940).
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the former. 138 But this claim merely obfuscates the matter, because
there is no real difference between the two. One does not imagine
that the lender would be willing to forgo interest if the borrower
promised not to "use" the money. Further, "obtaining" and "using"
money are functionally indistinguishable. If the borrower does not
pay the interest, the loan must be returned. One could make the same
point conversely: The loan itself is worthless if it must be repaid im-
mediately because the "borrower" does not agree to pay interest. In-
terest is what entitles the holder to retain-that is, to use-the loan
proceeds. Consider that as an economic matter, and apart from mar-
ket fluctuations, a lease, rental, or advance payment of any kind in
which the recipient makes ongoing payments for the use of the trans-
ferred item is equivalent to a series of such arrangements, each sepa-
rately negotiated, for the term during which payment for the use is
due. Thus, if we disregard the fact that market conditions change over
time, there is no economic difference between a one-year loan of $X
that provides for monthly interest payments of $Y and a return of the
$X principal at term, and twelve successive one-month loans of $X
each, each having $Y of total interest due. On Dodge's view, tax
would apply in the first case, but not the second. To be sure, there is
generally no reason to assume that market conditions will remain con-
stant, but it is in fact this assumption, and not the deferred obligation
to return the $X, that reflects the operation of the realization rule in
the case of advance receipts. 139 Thus, a twelve-month lease will lock
in the rental rate for the entire term, whereas successive one-month
leases lock in the terms for only one month. As market rates fluctuate
during the year, the value of the year-long lease will tip in one or the
other party's favor, but the tax system does not pick up this value shift
in the absence of a disposition, precisely because of the realization
rule.14
0
Second, Dodge's argument is based on a mistaken application of the
realization concept to advance payments.' 4' Even under a realization-
based income tax, incurring a liability should no more have a tax con-
sequence than does the purchase of an asset. If A purchases a long-
lived asset, we do not provide a deduction to A on the ground either
139 Dodge, note 1, at 266-67.
139 Thus, debt obligations generally are not marked to market. See IRC § 1271.
140 One also might argue that value is created ex ante in the parties' agreement to lock
in the rate for the term of the arrangement. Except to the extent both parties are risk
averse, one party will pay the other for assuming the risk she does not wish to bear. As an
example, nonrecourse debt generally bears a higher rate of interest than recourse debt.
See, e.g., Lloyd Cohen, The Puzzling Phenomenon of Interest-Rate Discounts on Auto
Loans, 27 J. Legal Stud. 483, 495 (1998) (noting the phenomenon in the case of auto loans).
This value, however, is consumer surplus.
141 1 thank Reed Shuldiner for clarification on this point.
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that she no longer has the cash used to purchase the asset or that she
will not realize the benefits of the purchase until future years. She is
deemed to have an asset the value of which equals its cost. That is, we
include in the value the future benefits that are expected to be re-
ceived from the asset. If we did not, the income tax would become a
cash flow tax. As explained above, the realization rule applies only in
that our expectation of the future value is not adjusted by market-
based events that occur after the purchase and before any disposition
of the asset. We presume, that is, that the value-for-value exchange
that occurs on the acquisition date remains the case (apart from de-
preciation or amortization 142) until subsequent disposition, at which
time the true-up occurs. If one wishes to treat obligations symmetri-
cally, as Dodge advocates, then the proper conclusion is that incurring
a liability is exactly analogous: Neither the receipt of the cash nor the
fact that the obligations will not become payable until a future period
should trigger an inclusion. 143 Fluctuations in the value of the debt
are not taken into account unless and until there is a disposition or
other realization of the obligation prior to maturity.
144
Third, the preceding observation demonstrates as well that Dodge's
realization argument rests on an incorrect analysis of the role that the
annual accounting period plays under the income tax. The realization
rule neither implies nor is implied by adoption of the annual account-
ing principle. In principle, it would be possible to have continuous
accounting under the income tax and yet to preserve the realization
rule, just as it is possible to have periodic accounting with mark-to-
market rules.145 In either case, the law would not disregard known
future liabilities. Again, if it did, the income tax would become a cash
142 See IRC §§ 167, 168. As explained at note 178, the deductions for business-related
expenditures under these provisions or under § 162 reflect a decision to account for value
shifts rather than an attempt to account for a loss the taxpayer suffers.
143 Dodge argues that asymmetry on this point is justified because the payor can sell the
right acquired from the payee at any time to a third party, whereas the obligor cannot
discharge the obligation except by providing services or payment in the future. Dodge,
note 1, at 257-58. The main problem with this observation is that it should lead to mark-to-
market taxation of the repayment right. Further, in many instances the obligor on the
payment also will be able to discharge the obligation through payment to a third party, in
which case, on Dodge's view, she should not be taxed. In point of fact, the capacity of the
payor to dispose of the obligation is irrelevant to the nondeductibility of the loan. The
reason the payor is treated as having an equal offsetting asset has nothing to do with the
fact that it can be sold. It follows from the fact that an income tax reaches changes in
wealth, and there has been none.
144 See United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931) (holding that the taxpayer
realized cancellation of indebtedness income on repurchase of its own obligations at a dis-
count); see also IRC § 166 (deduction for worthless debts).
145 See Jeff Strnad, Periodicity and Accretion Taxation: Norms and Implementation, 99
Yale L.J. 1817, 1822 (1990) (noting that a Haig-Simons accretion tax can have any period in
principle).
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flow tax. 146 The point of periodic accounting is not to disregard obli-
gations that fall outside of the present period, but to provide a conve-
nient method for reckoning known tax liabilities. That is why, even
under a realization-based income tax, it is incorrect to say that
whether a genuine accession to wealth occurs depends on the arbi-
trary period in which it is accounted for, when known future obliga-
tions (or income items, for that matter) happen to fall outside of the
period. In this regard, the realization rule merely requires holding off
on certain inclusions or deductions that arise apart from a transaction
or disposition of some sort. Indeed the very idea that a present right
to a future value represents an item of wealth, widely accepted as a
core principle of income taxation, is inseparable from the idea that the
concept of wealth must include anticipated events expected to occur
outside of the period in which income is calculated. 147 There is no
apparent reason why the same rule should not apply to future
liabilities.1
48
The following example illustrates the fundamentally arbitrary na-
ture of the accounting period and its relationship to real economic
income. Assume that the income tax were calculated on the basis of a
calendar decade rather than a calendar year. Under Dodge's propo-
sal, the tax consequences to a borrower of a nine-year term loan
would vary dramatically depending on the date of borrowing-if after
the first year of the calendar decade, a large tax liability would arise
from the borrowing; if prior to the first year, none at all. The periodic
nature of the income tax, which results largely from the administrative
need to collect tax on an ongoing basis, coupled with the fact that it is
not possible to know lifetime income prior to the end of the life,149
should not be thought determinative in assessing the timing or amount
146 Id. at 1819.
147 The concept underlies the doctrine of economic benefit, according to which taxpay-
ers will be deemed in receipt of income when their rights to an item of income in the future
are fixed and do not depend on the provision of services or other consideration for them.
See Pulsifer v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 245 (1975). The notion that a fixed right to a future
payment constitutes present income is so fundamental to the income tax that the few provi-
sions deferring tax in such situations are expressly understood to constitute tax-favored
rules that adopt consumption tax or consumption tax-like principles. See, e.g., IRC § 72(a)
(tax-free inside build-up of annuities), § 401(k) (retirement plans), § 403(b) (certain retire-
ment annuities), § 408 (IRAs), § 408A (Roth IRAs); see also Bittker & Lokken, note 22,
3.7 (discussing the consumption tax features of such provisions).
148 Consider that consistent application of Dodge's rule would seem to require disre-
gard, for tax purposes, of the obligation to do the work as a condition of payment therefor.
Thus, in the common case of a term employment contract of an accrual method taxpayer,
the taxpayer under the Dodge approach would seem to be required to report the expected
income when the contract was signed, since the obligation to provide the future services
should be disregarded in the same way as it is when the payment is made immediately.
149 See generally Lee Anne Fennell & Kirk J. Stark, Taxation over Time, 59 Tax L. Rev.
1 (2005) (discussing reasons for, and effects of, periodic income taxation).
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of the taxpayer's economic income. There is nothing substantive
about the period itself. How much wealth a person has right now does
not depend on whether the period in which "right now" occurs ex-
tends far enough out to embrace an obligation that we also know
about, "right now."
Ultimately, the problem with Dodge's analysis is that he proceeds
from the assumption that the receipt of loan proceeds represents an
accession to wealth, so that the question becomes whether there is any
reason to treat the future obligation to repay as a basis for denying the
inclusion. The preceding analysis shows that the receipt of loan pro-
ceeds is a fully paid-for purchase of liquidity, not an accession to
wealth. The borrower purchases the use of the money in a voluntary
transaction. Therefore the question of whether the future obligation
provides a currently creditable "offset" to a current accession never
arises. There is no current accession.
3. Other Receipts and Rationales
I return now to the question of advance receipts more generally. As
indicated in Part II, commentators have suggested that factors such as
the payee's complete dominion over the receipt or her ability to use
the receipt to finance personal consumption indicate that, at least as
far as a realization-based income tax is concerned, advance receipts
should be treated as income prior to being earned. 150 The object here
is to show that other sorts of advance receipts generally cannot be
distinguished from loans. Therefore, if the case for the nontaxation of
loan proceeds is sound, then, purely as a matter of measuring income
and without regard to practical questions of tax administration, other
kinds of advance receipts also should not be taxed before they have
been earned.
i. Dominion
Consider first the idea that the recipient's control over the proceeds
of an advance payment would be relevant to the income tax treatment
of them. If the normative justification for income taxation is that it
reflects ability to pay, then inclusion on the basis that control provides
such an ability is misguided because control can be purchased, as the
150 Dodge, note 1, at 256-58 (dominion); Johnson, note 2. at 387-88 (criticizing on
grounds of availability for personal use the argument that prepaid services income is akin
to a trust fund the payee holds on behalf of the payor); see also Am. Auto. Ass'n v. Com-
missioner, 367 U.S. 687 (1961); Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963) (both noting
as relevant that the taxpayer faced no restrictions on the use of the funds received).
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loan case illustrates. 151 More to the point, the tax law must and does
assume that control, or liquidity, is purchased separately from owner-
ship in the case of an advance receipt, a point that commentators on
both sides of the advance receipts debate recognize. 152 A pure income
tax will always impute interest to advance payment obligations, be-
cause it is taken as axiomatic that parties dealing with each other at
arm's length exchange value for value. 153 In the case of a loan, the
borrower has full control over the loan proceeds, but no income be-
cause the control is paid for with interest.
The same holds for other kinds of advance receipts, and for the
same reason. The recipient of the advance payment will pay for con-
trol over the receipt in one way or another. Either there will be an
explicit interest component (as, for instance, in the case of a "deposit"
that requires the payee to pay or set aside interest for the benefit of
the payor), or the prepayment will be made at a discount that reflects
implicit interest that otherwise would be earned, or the arrangement
will combine elements of both explicit interest and a discount.154 In
all events, the noninterest portion must be excluded from income on
the same basis that loan proceeds are: It is paid for with interest,
which is another way of saying that dominion is purchased. Total af-
ter-tax wealth before the purchase equals total wealth after, assuming
that the purchase of control is financed with after-tax dollars.
155
Consider the case of a prepayment of salary income at the end of
Year 1 for work to be done at the end of Year 2. Suppose that if the
amount were to be paid at the end of Year 2, the service provider
would be expected to charge $X. One would expect any of the follow-
ing to occur: First, the amount of the prepayment ($Y) could be less
than $X by an amount such that, if invested at the rate of return the
service recipient could otherwise earn, the prepayment would equal
$X at the end of Year 2.156 The service provider therefore should be
151 Note that Simons himself seems to have recognized this point, as he did not view the
receipt of loan proceeds as income. See Dodge, note 1, at 253 n.33 ("Even Henry Simons
ignored the tax treatment of borrowing .... ").
152 Johnson, note 2, at 387 ("[T]here is no such thing as an interest-free loan"); Klein,
note 3, at 1695 ("From an economic perspective there are no interest free loans, only hid-
den, or imputed, interest. The hidden interest ... is always there."); Daniel I. Halperin,
Interest in Disguise: Taxing the "Time Value of Money," 95 Yale L.J. 506, 516 (1986).
153 See, e.g., Klein, note 3, at 1695; see also IRC § 7872.
154 Klein, note 3, at 1695.
155 Where the purchase is financed in whole or part with pretax dollars, tax would arise
on the purchase. If, for example, the debtor made interest payments with appreciated
property, the gain on the property would be taxed to the debtor on its transfer to the
creditor. See IRC § 1001. Of course, the tax would not be on the receipt of the proceeds
but on the dollars used to pay the interest obligation.
156 The example unrealistically assumes that $X remains the market price of the services
during the entire period. If the actual price of the services kept pace with the rate of return
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charged interest, which it is then deemed to pay over to the service
recipient. Second, the full $X could be prepaid to the service pro-
vider, with the service provider paying explicit interest on the prepay-
ment until the work were performed. Finally, the prepayment could
be some amount between $Y and $X, with explicit interest covering
the difference. Note that in substance these are the only possibili-
ties. 157 Thus, if the arrangement involved solely a prepayment, with
no explicit interest component, a pure income tax would impute inter-
est on the payment. 158 In each of these situations, the interest compo-
nent should be taxable, but because interest is the price of control,
there is by definition no income from the receipt itself.
Lastly, the control argument proves too much. Lessees of property
obtain control over the leased property, at least to some extent, but as
far as I am aware no one has suggested inclusion of leaseholds in in-
come in a manner consistent with the control theory.159 Although
there are limits on the extent of that control, under the control theory
it is these limits, and not the fact that the lessee pays rent (tantamount
to interest) for the use of the property, that would determine the ex-
tent of the lessee's income. For example, consider a lease of undevel-
oped real property for a fifteen-year term. The lease customarily
requires monthly rent at a fair market rate. Under the control theory,
on the date the lease is signed, the lessee has income to the tune of the
portion of the fair market value of the land over which it has acquired
control, which is to say the value of the land that will be available to
the lessee during the term of the lease. 160 Separately, the lessee has
deductions for rent and, presumably, a deduction either on termina-
tion of the lease equal to the original inclusion (if the realization rule
is thought to preclude the deduction prior to that time) or over time as
the value of the term declines due to the passage of time (if the reali-
zation rule is not thought to preclude such a deduction). 161 At the
that the service recipient could earn on the proceeds, then one would expect the prepay-
ment to be $X, but interest would be imputed as described in the example nonetheless.
157 The same principle operates in the original issue discount context and in the deferred
sale context. See IRC §§ 1271-1275 (original issue discount), § 483 (imputing interest to
certain deferred sales of property).
158 See IRC § 7872.
159 Charlotte Crane makes the same observation in connection with her criticism of
Dodge's article. See Crane, note 123, at 580.
160 Assuming economic rather than statutory depreciation, the sinking fund method
would apply to determine what percentage of the factory's value the lease term consumed.
See Marvin A. Chirelstein, Federal Income Taxation: A Law Student's Guide to the Lead-
ing Cases and Concepts 169-72 (10th ed. 2005) (describing the sinking fund theory as ap-
plied to depreciable capital assets).
161 Strictly speaking, the lessee should be permitted to amortize the leasehold under the
sinking fund method. See id. Generally, however, the tax law will not permit amortization
as long as the lessor remains the "tax owner" of the property. See Shaviro, note 110, at
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same time, however, the lessor either will (inconsistently) disregard
both the "loss" on disposition and the "gain" on reacquisition for the
simple reason that each involves an exchange at arm's length, 162 or
would treat the transaction entirely differently from how it is treated
under current law, as generating a deduction equal to the present
value of the leasehold and generating inclusions over time as the
lease's term nears. The former reflects current law but is inconsistent
with the lessee's inclusion, while the latter has no support in the in-
come tax because the lessor is in the same position as a lender.
ii. Source of Payment or Repayment
As previously discussed, a number of commentators have suggested
that the source or presumptive source of repayment is relevant to the
question whether the advance receipt should trigger an immediate in-
clusion. This approach would seem to offer a basis for distinguishing
advance payment of salary income from loans and other items, such as
deposits, which may reflect an expectation that the recipient will re-
turn an "after-tax" amount. Calvin Johnson uses the example of a
lawyer, L, who is prepaid $1 million for five years of personal services,
to illustrate the idea.163 As contrasted with a recipient of loan pro-
ceeds, L will discharge the obligation with personal services, and
"[w]hether the services are future services, past services or services
performed simultaneously with payment, they cannot offset reported
compensation," 164 because the service provider has no basis in those
services. Thus, the failure to include the receipt currently is not
merely a timing error, "but a graver error of giving respect to items
that cannot be treated as a cost at any time.'
65
The source of repayment approach fares no better as a measure of
the true income of the parties than does the dominion approach or
any other that focuses on the flow of funds rather than on accessions
to wealth. Like the others, it mistakes an identification of the likely
future consequence of the advance payment (that it will be offset by
an income item and thereby become income to the service provider)
649-50. Assuming the lessor does remain the tax owner, on return the lessee instead would
simply deduct the original payment, as described in the text.
162 Dodge, note 1, at 258-59. In other words, on Dodge's view, loans, leases, and other
advance payment transactions create income out of nothing on inception, and then cancel
that income on termination. This problem is explored in more detail below. See text ac-
companying notes 174-180. Crane notes the same difficulty with Dodge's argument as that
discussed here. Crane, note 123, at 568-69.
163 Johnson, note 2, at 385-86. In his example, Johnson designates the lawyer as F and
the lawyer's client, which I refer to below as C, as Z Inc..
164 Id. at 385.
165 Id.
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for the nature of the advance payment itself. But the question is not
the anticipated source of repayment, but whether the advance pay-
ment itself constitutes income. It is clear that it does not. As an initial
matter, note that essentially the same analysis Johnson adopts for ad-
vance services receipts should apply to loan proceeds, yet Johnson is
not troubled by the general rule for loans.1 66 Suppose that instead of
securing advance payment from C, L obtains a bank loan on the
strength of his anticipated future earnings. This, of course, is perfectly
typical: In the case of individual borrowers, even secured debt is ex-
pected to be repaid out of future wage income, yet no one, other than
Dodge, suggests that loan proceeds should be taxable. The question
then becomes whether, from the perspective of pure income measure-
ment, the fact that the lender is also the service recipient should mat-
ter. Thus, one can imagine a series of intermediate steps between a
genuine third-party loan that is repaid by the borrower directly, and a
loan that the service recipient extends to the service provider and
treats as repaid by means of book entries as and when the service
provider actually provides her services. The differences among the
arrangements that lie along this continuum are purely formal. 1 67 Un-
less one is prepared to say that L has income under this ordinary bank
loan, there is no reason in pure economic terms to treat a loan ex-
tended by the service recipient any differently, and indeed this ar-
rangement is not materially different from most consumer loans,
which are expected to be repaid with as-yet untaxed borrower income.
More to the point, Johnson's analysis, like Dodge's in the case of
loan proceeds, conflates two distinct issues that must be kept separate
in order to arrive at a proper understanding of the income tax conse-
quences of an advance receipt. The fact that an obligation will or is
highly likely to be discharged with services income, or indeed with
anything having a basis in the advance payee's hands different from
the value of what is received, does not answer the question of whether
the recipient has income now. The basis of the property or services
that the recipient will use to discharge the liability tells us only how
much income (or loss) she will have if and as the obligation is dis-
charged. Prior to that time (and setting aside the very real issue of the
166 Id. at 384.
167 Intermediate arrangements might include: (1) a genuine loan from a third-party
bank where the borrower permits the bank to garnishee her wages, (2) an agreement
among the bank, the borrower/service provider, and the service recipient that the service
recipient would deposit wages directly with the bank as they were earned, and (3) the
service provider's borrowing from the service recipient directly, but in an arrangement
where the loan and the service contract were kept formally separate, so that the service
recipient formally paid wages and the service provider formally paid interest and repaid
loan principal.
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time value of the $1 million payment), 168 the economic position of L is
no different from that of the obligor on a $1 million loan, as evidenced
by the fact that it is possible to replicate the arrangement through an
explicit loan. L is on the hook for $1 million, either of services, or of
cash (or property) if he fails to provide the services. Before L pro-
vides those services, he is obligated to pay "rent" for the prepayment
that he holds, just because the exchange of services for cash-which is
what gives rise to the creation of income-has not happened yet. Rent
is, after all, the cost of the use of an item that one does not own. If the
income had been created, then no rent for the right to hold the pre-
payment would arise. The fact that L has a zero basis in the services is
immaterial, because the exchange of the services for the payment has
not occurred, as indeed not even the production of the services them-
selves has occurred. To be sure, the enrichment of L, or some of it, is
likely to occur, and we might well (indeed we often do) impose a tax
on likely income, for administrative reasons. 169 Setting aside practical
concerns about tax collection or administration and focusing only on
the conceptual question of when income arises, there is no basis for
attributing $1 million to L on receipt of the proceeds. Likely income,
while often a good administrative substitute for actual income, is not
the same as actual income.
It is worth noting that the source argument has an affinity with the
rejection of the matching principle as a basis for the timing of advance
receipts for tax purposes. The matching principle, it will be recalled,
seeks to associate income items with the costs associated with earning
them. From an accounting perspective, the deferral of the income un-
til the costs are incurred makes sense, because the purpose of the ac-
counting rules is to provide an accurate reflection of the financial
health of the business. 170 If items are accounted accessions to wealth
without regard to how much it costs to earn them, then the accounting
rules will fail to provide a measure of the true financial soundness of
the business. For example, the taxpayer may receive $100 today for
services it provides next year that turn out to cost her $105. Booking
the $100 as income would fail to provide an accurate picture of the
business. By deferring the inclusion for accounting purposes until the
costs are incurred, the distortion is eliminated.
Tax accounting, however, is not transactional in this regard; rather
its purpose is to provide an accurate measure of wealth accessions
during the accounting period. The question is not whether the tax-
168 See Section III.B.
169 See Gunn, note 17, at 20-21 (1984) (noting and questioning arguments for immediate
taxation of prepayments on the grounds of administrative convenience and protecting the
fisc).
170 Id. at 12-13.
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payer makes money on an ongoing basis, but how much income she
had during the current period. Accordingly, the availability or not of
a deduction in a future period does not bear directly on whether the
taxpayer has income on a current advance receipt, and commentators
in the tax area have rightly rejected the notion that tax should "follow
book."' 171 Johnson's source argument for current inclusion takes this
observation one step further, noting that the costs L may incur to pro-
vide services to C will be in the form of zero-basis labor, so no future
deduction will be available anyway.1 72 Hence, the tax justification for
deferring inclusion that the matching principle might be thought to
justify disappears: Even if one thought tax accounting ought to defer
inclusion where known future liabilities loomed, the argument for
deferral dissolves if the future liabilities have zero tax cost.
The problem with this argument, and with the rejection of the
matching theory on which it is based, is not that it is wrong but that it
misses the point. Although, in my view, tax commentators are correct
to reject the matching principle as a basis to determine the timing of
income for tax purposes, the question of deferral of an advance re-
ceipt for tax purposes has nothing to do with the matching principle,
because deferral of an income item has nothing to do with the deduc-
tion side of the equation in the first place. It has to do with the in-
come side, which means that the matching principle plays no role.
Wholly apart from whether lawyer L has incurred or will incur ex-
penses-deductible or not-to provide the services, he has not earned
the income at the time of receipt because he has not done the work.
Rather, he is still beholden to the client until the time during which he
is obligated to provide them has elapsed. Prior to that time he holds
the money subject to return, and therefore subject to an obligation to
pay interest, whether explicit or imputed by the tax law.
A simple elaboration of Johnson's example illustrates the issue.
Consider the case in which the services L is to provide are personal to
the client C. C has no deduction on payment because she has received
a long-lived asset worth what she paid, 173 and she would have no
amortization over the five-year term because the expenditure is per-
sonal in nature. 174 If L has income on receipt, prior to his providing
any services at all, we must explain how income has been created out
of nothing. After all, C still has an asset worth $1 million, and there is
no reason to view C's payment as creating a loss to C at any time: If L
in the following year cancels the arrangement, never providing the
171 Geier, note 4, passim; Gunn, note 17, at 2 and passim.
172 See Johnson, note 2, at 375 (expressly assuming that L has a zero basis in all costs
associated with satisfying the service obligation).
173 INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
174 IRC § 262.
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services, he would have to return the full $1 million to C, who would
be out nothing in income terms. 175 Hence, in addition to positing the
creation of wealth ex nihilo, we also must posit its subsequent return
to the void should the arrangement be cancelled. The only way to
avoid this ultimately nonsensical result is to recognize that treating the
prepayment as income represents a decision to tax "likely income,"
not income itself.
Nor is the situation any different where the cost is deductible or
amortizable to the payor; the analysis is just more nuanced. In the
above example, if C's expenditure is business rather than personal in
nature, she still may not deduct the expense, though she may be able
to amortize it over the five-year term, assuming the services are not
otherwise allocable to a particular asset. 176 Thus we are still left with
the difficulty of creating income out of thin air on initial transfer, but
at least over time there is some recognition that C bears a cost that is
associated with L's income. Moreover, in some instances a prepay-
ment for benefits might be deductible to a cash method taxpayer even
though the benefits were not to be realized until sometime in the fu-
ture.177 In that case, the advance payee's putative income would be
matched by a deduction on the payor side.
Even if all business related advance payments were immediately de-
ductible, however, the analysis would not change. The deduction for
business expenses, set forth in § 162(a), is predicated on the idea that
the value the payor receives in exchange for the expense in fact ap-
pears in the goods or services the payor sells, not that the payor has
suffered a loss as a result of the payment. 178 The deduction does not
175 Again, for purposes of the discussion, I disregard the implicit interest element inher-
ent in such an arrangement. The interest element is discussed in detail in Section III.B.
176 Section 263 continues to apply to deny the immediate deduction, and § 263A may
apply where the services are used for the production of an asset by C, but the general rules
permitting amortization of long-lived business assets apply. § 167. If C is an accrual
method taxpayer, she also must negotiate the economic performance rules of § 461(h),
which generally would require her to deduct the payments over the five-year term. See
Reg. § 1.461-4(d)(2). These rules would not change the argument here.
177 See IRC § 174 (research and experimental expenditures), § 175 (soil and water con-
servation expenditures), § 179 (certain tangible business assets or computer software).
178 Note that this is the theory underlying § 263A's requirement that certain costs be
capitalized to inventory. See § 263A(a)(1); S. Rep. No. 313, 99th Cong. 140 (1986). Losses
are separately accounted for under § 165. See generally Bittker & Lokken, note 22,
25.8.5; Rev. Rul. 79-80, 1979-1 C.B. 86 (distinguishing between expenses for acquiring
securities deductible under § 162(a) and losses on purchase or sale of wrong securities
deductible under § 165(a)); Holt v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 75 (1977) ("The distinction be-
tween losses and expenses has generally been regarded as self-evident.").
There is some disagreement in the literature on this point. A number of commentators
view deductions for depreciation and § 162 expenses as reflective of a loss that the tax-
payer sustains, either over time or immediately, as the case may be. Geier, for example,
describes the role of the depreciation deduction as "allow[ing] the deduction of final, pas-
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
[Vol. 61:
2008] THE TAX TREATMENT OF ADVANCE RECEIPTS
represent an ex ante loss, for if it did the payor would not enter into
the transaction that produces it. Rather it represents a recognition
that a deduction is an appropriate way to account for the transfer of
value from the item paid for to the goods or services that their pro-
ducer sells. The deduction will be appropriate because either the con-
nection between the expenditure and the associated income is too
attenuated to be identified with a particular item (and there is no mis-
match of income and expense in permitting an immediate deduction)
or there is no functional difference between providing an immediate
deduction and requiring capitalization into the goods or services the
taxpayer sells, followed by reduced income on sale of the goods or
services. 179 In short, the deduction under § 162 is a kind of realization
rule, not an acknowledgment of a loss to the payor. 180 It remains the
case even in the business setting that wealth is deemed created out of
nothing under the inclusion/no deduction approach to advance
receipts.
sage-of-time losses of income-producing property." Geier, note 4, at 58. This characteriza-
tion seems implausible, however, inasmuch as, first, it is not the passage of time but the use
of property that causes depreciation-at least of tangible assets-and, second, it becomes
wholly unclear why depreciation is not available for personal expenditures, since the puta-
tive loss would be sustained in either case. A better view understands § 165 as applying
when the taxpayer sustains a loss, while depreciation (and amortization) and expensing
reflect accounting principles. No loss is sustained under depreciation or expensing; rather,
value is transferred from the used asset to, ultimately, goods or services sold, and the de-
duction loosely reflects the portion of after-tax dollars "transferred" from the depreciated
or expensed asset to the good or service. In other words, these provisions reflect a method
to account for the transfer of value. A deduction offers a method for reasonable approxi-
mation of net income. The associated income is recognized on disposition of the goods or
services the expenditure enables the taxpayer to create. Thus, one could achieve the same
result by denying the deduction and, instead, increasing the costs of goods sold by the same
amount. In the personal context the value is transferred to the owner as an item of con-
sumption and so no deduction for depreciation, amortization, or expense is allowed. See
Charlotte Crane, Liabilities and the Need to Keep the Income Tax Base Closed, 25 Va. Tax
Rev. 31, 42-45 (2005); Douglas A. Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation-Tax Expenditure or
Proper Allowance for Measuring Net Income?, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1979). This account
also explains why a deduction for a casualty loss remains available in the case of personal
property. See IRC § 165(c)(3).
179 See Encyclopaedia Britannica v. Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212 (7th Cir. 1982) (discuss-
ing theory of capitalization and expensing). Thus, it is not surprising that Congress, the
courts, and the Service all generally have endeavored to force capitalization whenever the
prospect that an expenditure creates a long-lived asset is real. See, e.g., IRC § 263 (requir-
ing capitalization for long-lived assets), § 263A (extending same principles to self-created
assets); INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992) (capitalization required even
if expenditure does not create a separate, distinct asset but merely enhances life of existing
asset); Rev. Rul. 2000-4, 2000-1 C.B. 331 (explaining capitalization and expensing princi-
ples); see generally Bittker & Lokken, note 22, $ 105A.1.
180 See Crane, note 178, at 55 (noting that costs of production are generally accounted
for either by immediate deduction or by additions to basis in costs of goods sold).
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iii. Personal Use
Essentially the same criticism may be made of the idea that the per-
sonal benefit associated with consumption or potential consumption
of advance receipts justifies treating them as income on receipt. The
tying of the taxation of receipts to their use is not inherently a part of
the income concept, but rather reflects a cash flow model of taxation
designed to approximate a consumption tax.18' Under an income tax,
the object is not to trace the type of use made of wealth, but to iden-
tify the accession to wealth in the first place.18 2 In this regard it fo-
cuses on the "front end" of the taxpayer's activities. A consumption
tax, because it applies only to the preclusive use of wealth for personal
purposes, cannot apply until the use to which an item is put is identi-
fied. Further, because the use of funds can be purchased separately
(as in a loan), and therefore dissociated from an accession to wealth,
tying the income tax consequences to their use will be incorrect when-
ever borrowed funds finance consumption. In short, the income con-
cept is different from the consumption concept. One can be perfectly
capable of consumption or use of property that does not represent an
accession to wealth. That, indeed, is why people borrow.
B. Time Value of Money Principles
The discussion to this point has largely disregarded the way in
which the tax law should address a disguised interest element that is
present in an advance payment arrangement. In this Section, I ad-
dress some of the mechanisms available under current law that reach
hidden interest.
Consider an agreement to prepay service income. To the extent the
agreement fails to provide for adequate interest, a pure income tax
would assume either that a discount is present on the amount paid to
account for the fact that the recipient receives the money earlier, or, if
a discount is absent, that some additional compensatory or other com-
181 William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87
Harv. L. Rev. 1113, 1116, passim (1974). Note that strictly speaking, a cash flow tax is not
the same as a consumption tax, because a cash flow tax presumptively treats outlays used
for personal items as fully taxable on receipt. Such personal items, however, often are not
fully consumed in the period in which the outlay occurs, as for instance a car or any other
long-lived consumer durable. The failure to allow a partial deduction of the cost of such
outlays is the consumption tax version of the realization rule under the income tax. See
Engler & Knoll, note 128, at 73-78. The distortion from this error is ameliorated by the
fact that the imputed interest on consumption value under a cash flow tax is disregarded as
well. See Andrews, supra, at 1155-56.
182 Andrews, note 181, at 1113 ("Serious thought about personal income tax policy has
come to be dominated by an ideal in which taxable income is set equal to total personal
gain or accretion, without distinctions as to source or use.").
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ponent is present that should be taken into account for income tax
purposes. 183 The presence of interest in actual cases makes the analy-
sis of prepayments more complex, because a true income tax will pick
up interest as it accrues (and generally provide a deduction therefor to
the payor). 184 Contrary to the conclusions of some commentators,
however, the presence of interest does not change the fundamental
analysis of whether the prepayment constitutes income. 185 In fact, the
presence of interest explains why prepayments are not taxable: Inter-
est is the fee the payee pays for the right to use the funds while they
remain the property of the payor.
Consider again Johnson's example of the lawyer, L, who receives $1
million at the close of Year 0 in exchange for the obligation to provide
personal services to a client during Years 1-5. If L and the client, C,
deal with each other at arm's length, then the present value of C's
payment should equal the expected cost of the services if they were
paid for on an as-rendered basis. Suppose interest rates are 10% com-
pounded annually, and payments for L's services ordinarily would be
due in full at the close of the calendar year in which they are provided.
Suppose further that L's fees are expected to keep pace with interest
rates, and that the discount to which L and C agree simply reflects this
expectation. In that case, L's current fee for a year's worth of services
is $200,000. Assuming annual compounding, the obligation to pay $1
million at the close of Year 0 is equivalent in present value terms to
annual payments totaling $1.343 million over the five-year term.l8 6 In
effect, C is paying for future services in part by earning interest on a
loan to L, who in turn applies the interest earned to offset a portion of
C's obligation to pay for the services, the balance coming from re-
maining "principal" on the prepayment. If we suppose the arrange-
ment lasts for the full five years, then at the end of each of Years 1-5,
C would have interest income and, depending upon the nature of the
legal services purchased (business or personal), potentially an offset-
ting deduction. L would have a deduction for deemed interest paid
and an inclusion equal to the interest and a portion of the principal
183 See generally Halperin, note 152, at 517.
184 The concern to identify and tax interest that economically accrues under a multitude
of arrangements pervades the Code. See IRC § 61(a)(3) (general interest inclusion), § 163
(interest deduction), § 453 (imputing interest to certain installment obligations), § 483 (in-
clusion of disguised interest in deferred payment property transactions), § 1272 (inclusion
for accrued but not currently payable interest on original issue discount obligations),
§ 7872 (identifying and taxing as such interest implicit in certain below-market-loan
arrangements).
185 See Section III.B; Johnson, note 2, at 386-90.
186 That is, at the close of Year 1, C would pay $220,000, at the close of Year 2, $242,000,
and so on.
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together totaling the amount of his service income. Table 1 illustrates
these outcomes.
TABLE 1
INTEREST AND PRINCIPAL PAID ON $1 MILLION
DRAWN OVER FIVE YEARS
Interest Payment Post-Payment
Year Earned to L Principal
1 $100,000 $220,000 $880,000
2 88,000 242,000 726,000
3 72,600 266,200 532,400
4 53,240 292,820 292,820
5 29,282 322,102 0
Total $343,122 $1,343,122 -
The interest that is earned represents a true accession to wealth,
ultimately for C, and the tax system should pick it up as well as pro-
vide a deduction for L. As discussed previously, under current law
this would not be the result. Instead, L would have to include the $1
million on receipt. 187 Full inclusion is incorrect because it overtaxes L
and undertaxes C, while deferral that does not include a deemed in-
terest portion also would be incorrect because it undertaxes L. Fur-
ther, if, as may be customary in such arrangements, the agreement
provides that C is entitled to return of a portion of the fee in the event
of cancellation, an additional amount needs to be accounted for if the
arrangement in fact is cancelled. For example, if the agreement is can-
celled after Year 1 with L returning $800,000 to C, C still should in-
clude the interest earned on the full $1 million during the year, or
$100,000. C also should be treated as having paid $220,000 in attor-
ney's fees, since that is L's going rate. Finally, C has made an addi-
tional $80,000 payment to L at that time, representing an additional
fee for services, includible in Year 1.188
187 See Reg. § 1.451-1(a) (cash method taxpayers). Even if L were an accrual method
taxpayer, it does not appear he could defer inclusion under the theory that the arrange-
ment parallels that in Artnell. The exception for future services is particularly narrow and
generally applies only where the particular services can be closely identified with the
payment.
188 The analysis is similar to that applicable to Indianapolis Power & Light and its cus-
tomers, discussed at text accompanying notes 36-51. The $80,000 payment is a separate
income item paid to the service provider that should be included in income. The difference
from the Indianapolis Power facts is that because payment of the item is contingent on L's
not providing the services, it cannot be included before the contingency is resolved unless
the likelihood that the services will be provided is so low as to be negligible. See Reg.
§ 1.1275-4 (applying the wait-and-see approach to certain contingent payment debt instru-
ments). In any event, the item is best viewed as a cancellation penalty. See Edward J.
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Although current law does not provide for the preceding treatment,
it now provides a mechanism to tax the hidden interest element pre-
sent in such arrangements, assuming the transaction was treated as a
loan. Under § 7872, the unstated interest element present in certain
"below-market loans" is taxed under one of two regimes. In the case
of term loans, the initial payment is bifurcated into an OID-like debt
instrument and a separate payment that is characterized according to
its economic substance (as, for example, rent, compensation, a gift,
and the like). 8 9 In the case of demand or gift loans, the lender is
deemed to make an annual payment to the borrower equal to the in-
terest forgone by the lender on the loan amount.190 This supplement
likewise is characterized according to its economic substance. Under
both term-loan and demand-loan treatment, the interest on what is
characterized as principal is treated as accruing during the life of the
arrangement, generating an inclusion for the lender and, subject to the
limits on interest deductions generally, a deduction for the
borrower.19'
Under regulations proposed under § 7872, the $1 million payment
to L would be subject to § 7872, assuming it were treated as a loan.
Under the broad interpretation of the term "loan" that applies under
those regulations, 192 the $1 million fee would be treated as a demand
loan, assuming that the arrangement could be cancelled at any time
with a ratable portion of the $1 million returnable to C.193 In that
case, at the end of each year during which a portion of the deposit was
outstanding, C would be deemed to make a payment to L equal in
amount to the interest forgone on the loan arrangement, and L in turn
would be deemed to pay C the interest.194 Thus, at the end of Year 1,
C would be deemed to pay L $100,000, which would be characterized
according to its substance as compensation. L would be deemed to
Schnee, Contract Cancellation Payments Raise Income and Deduction Issues, Practical
Tax Strategies for Lawyers/Accountants (2003).
189 IRC § 7872(b).
190 IRC § 7872(a).
191 IRC § 7872(b)(2). Section 163 generally permits a deduction for business interest.
Personal interest generally is not deductible, see IRC § 163(h), while investment interest is
subject to a separate basketing regime that may result in the deferral of the interest deduc-
tion until the taxpayer has offsetting investment income. IRC § 163(d). In addition, the
passive activity rules and the at-risk rules may defer interest deductions for business inter-
est in certain cases. IRC §§ 465, 469.
192 See Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-2(a)(1), (3); see also Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 98th
Cong., General Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of
1984, at 529 (Comm. Print 1984) ("[A]ny transfer of money that provides the transferor
with a right to repayment is a loan.").
193 See Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-10(a)(5) (treating all compensation-related loans in which
the benefit of the below-market discount is not transferable as demand loans).
194 See Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-6.
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pay C $100,000 in interest. Finally, C would be deemed to transfer
$200,000 of principal to L, also as compensation for services. Simi-
larly, at the end of Year 2, C would be deemed to pay L $80,000, equal
to the interest forgone on $800,000. C also would have an $80,000
interest inclusion and a deemed payment of $200,000 principal to L.
Although the preceding treatment does not precisely track the real
economics of the arrangement, it is tolerably close. If we assume that
$200,000 of the deposit is "paid" to L annually, then the total imputed
interest turns out to be $300,000.195 The result differs from the pre-
ceding analysis because it unrealistically assumes that the services ac-
count for $200,000 annually. Nonetheless, the $43,000 discrepancy is
relatively minor given the total values involved. At all events, neither
the fact of imputed interest nor the fact that the proposed regulations
fail to reach the precisely correct result bolsters the case for immedi-
ate inclusion of the $1 million. Johnson argues to the contrary, stating
that the extra services that C impliedly receives for interest "supports
the argument that L has a $1 million improvement in value immedi-
ately when the unearned payments are received. ' 196 As a basis for
this conclusion he notes that the presence of implicit interest indicates
that the future services have a present value of $1 million, and that the
provision of interest and principal in the form of zero-basis services
means L must be taxed immediately. As contrasted with a genuine
loan (which Johnson would treat as a nontaxable event with respect to
the transfer of the loan proceeds, just as under current law), the inter-
est on the loan is retained by L.
197
Johnson's analysis appears simply to restate the conclusion. The
fact that L receives a payment of $1 million does not establish that the
payment is income, even if it earns (or is deemed to earn) interest at a
market rate. To the contrary, the fact that it earns interest establishes
the opposite conclusion. It is what makes the arrangement in sub-
stance a loan. If L has a $1 million "improvement in value," while C
has suffered no loss in value (C has an asset worth $1 million), then as
previously noted, value has been created out of nothing, only to be
destroyed if or to the extent that L never provides the services and
refunds the balance. 198 If retention of the money is contingent on L's
provision of future services, and they are of equal value to the $1 mil-
lion, then he has received nothing: He has an obligation to turn over
to C an amount equal to what he has received from her. His basis in
195 This amount equals the sum of deemed interest payments resulting from a deemed
annual allocation of $200,000 to L ($100,000 + $80,000 + $60,000 + $40,000 + $20,000).
196 Johnson, note 2, at 386.
197 Id. at 386-87.
198 Under Johnson's and Dodge's approaches, income could be multiplied without limit
by the simple expedient of having taxpayers make obligations to each other.
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the services is not relevant to what he has received. Similarly, the fact
that in a genuine loan arrangement explicit interest would be paid
over (or accounted for as OID) to the lender, whereas L pays no ex-
press interest to C, is of no significance. L economically turns over
the interest by providing services worth $1 million plus the interest
that $1 million generates in an arm's length transaction, as Johnson
himself stipulates. In fact, it is the payment of interest for the use of
the money that justifies treating the advance payment itself as not in-
come. L purchases the use of the money in an on-market transaction.
C. Conclusion on Timing
Pure income tax treatment of advance payments would defer taxa-
tion unless and until the payment is earned in some way. This result
follows on any sufficiently precise definition of "income," which ulti-
mately is neither an accounting concept nor a measure of the extent to
which an individual may appropriate a particular item for use of
whatever kind. Income is a measure of net accession to wealth. 199 If
it were not, it would become impossible to explain the most elemen-
tary propositions of any true income tax, all of which, as far as I am
aware, are accepted by all authorities: that the mere entry into an
executory contract does not create wealth, 200 that the purchase of an
item in an arm's length exchange substitutes one form of wealth for
another of equal value, and that current income includes the increase
in the fair value of known future rights. A focus on dominion, realiza-
tion, or the deferral of a known repayment or performance obligation,
if used as a criterion for determining when and whether someone has
income, yields conclusions inconsistent with these basic verities. Con-
comitantly, the use of control as a criterion of income disregards the
essential role that interest-be it explicit, paid in the form of future
services or property, or present as an implicit discount on the amount
the payor pays-plays in the advance receipt context. The economic
value of what the recipient gets, which is the use of funds, is precisely
its cost, and that cost is paid for with interest.
It would not suffice to respond that the question is one of definition,
and that it makes more sense to include in the definition of income the
concept of control or receipt of cash than to omit either of these. If
199 Simons, note 99, at 50.
200 It might be argued that entry into an executory contract creates wealth in the form of
utility. See Daniel Shaviro, The Man Who Lost Too Much: Zarin v. Commissioner and the
Cost of Taxable Consumption, 45 Tax L. Rev. 215, 225-29 (1990). While I question the
appropriateness of treating income as a proxy for utility, it must be borne in mind that
even if income is so viewed, the taxation of the utility created through the conclusion of a
contract would be a unique instance of taxing consumer surplus. See text accompanying
notes 124-27.
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income is equated with the arrival of value at the doorstep, regardless
of the terms on which it comes, the notion that income has anything to
do with accession to wealth must be abandoned. Such a definition
does not merely require effacing the distinction between the one who
gets the value with no strings attached and the one who must repay. It
also presents an untenable choice on the payor side. Either the payor
who has a right to be made whole must be treated the same in income
terms as the one who has no such right, or only the payor who has a
right to be repaid must be treated as having received an asset from the
payee. The former proposition cannot possibly be right, and commen-
tators, presumably in an effort to avoid that contradiction, have gravi-
tated to the latter instead.20 1 That is surely correct as an income
matter, but this option only pushes the problem back to the payee
side. How can the mere arrangement between the parties have pro-
vided income to the payee without reducing the payor's wealth, even
though no net wealth has been created? Only by abandoning the idea
that income involves an accession to wealth is it possible to maintain
that an advance payment is genuine income to the payee. This aban-
donment is entirely reasonable under a cash flow consumption tax,
because such a tax does not purport to differentiate between con-
sumption that is financed by an obligation and consumption free and
clear; it simply measures, by the proxy of cash received, the preclusive
use of resources.
IV. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
I have argued that from an economic perspective, no income apart
from traditionally nontaxed consumer (or producer) surplus can be
said to arise on an advance receipt. What, then, of the various rules
providing for current taxation of advance receipts in some settings,
and deferral of tax in others? Should not all advance receipts be
treated as taxable as and when they are no longer subject to an offset-
ting obligation, and not before?
The tax administrator does not have the luxury of imposing tax only
as and when true income arises. The accrual method is an effort to
approximate that ideal, but even the accrual method gives way to
practical considerations that may result in deferral or acceleration of
income or expense for tax purposes as compared to the time at which
real economic income or expense arises.202 The cash method, of
201 See, e.g., Dodge, note 1, at 258-59.
202 As argued above, the general rule of immediate inclusion on prepayments for accrual
method taxpayers represents an acceleration of inclusion. Conversely, the economic per-
formance rules of § 461(h) represent a noneconomic deferral of expense deductions that
operate as a substitute for discounting of future payments on existing obligations.
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course, is a still coarser approximation of true income, designed in
part to make allowance for the fact that liquidity may not always at-
tend income. These departures from a regime that taxes true income
generally reflect the need to accommodate tax collection to these real-
ities. Moreover, when uniformity in the economic circumstances and
marginal tax rates of all parties involved is assumed, the revenue con-
sequence (though not the tax incidence) of current inclusion of the
advance receipt will be the same as an economically accurate accrual
of income and expense. From this perspective, the rule of current in-
clusion where it is not possible to tax the interest element of an ad-
vance payment arrangement offers a decent approximation of true
income taxation. The difficulties are that in the typical case such uni-
formity does not exist and the immediate inclusion rule taxes the
wrong party.
Beacon Publishing Co. v. Commissioner20 3 illustrates the issues.
Beacon, an accrual method taxpayer, received prepayments for peri-
ods of up to five years for subscription services it provided. Consis-
tent with generally accepted accounting principles, Beacon deferred
inclusion of the subscription amounts until the years in which the sub-
scriptions were provided.20 4 The Service sought to tax the subscrip-
tions on receipt and prevailed in the Tax Court. The Tenth Circuit
reversed on the basis that requiring current inclusion was inconsistent
with the accrual method, which, it held, requires deferral of both in-
come and expense items until the right or obligation, respectively, is
fixed.205 According to the court, requiring inclusion of subscription
payments on receipt while continuing to treat Beacon's deductions
under the accrual method would result in a failure of Beacon's ac-
counting method accurately to reflect its income. 20 6
Although the court's ruling stood in tension with prior authority on
the question20 7 (and certainly is in tension with subsequent Supreme
Court authority20 8), the result is in substance correct, apart from the
interest question. Because Beacon's entitlement to the subscription
payments was dependent upon its provision of the services, the
amounts were not earned prior thereto. The problem, of course, is
that Beacon obtained the use of the subscription income at no tax
cost, thereby creating a tax benefit. No interest was paid on the pre-
203 218 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1955).
204 Id. at 698.
205 Id. at 700-01; see Reg. § 1.451-1(a) (inclusion), § 1.461-1(a)(2) (deduction for accrual
method taxpayers).
206 Beacon, 218 F.2d at 701.
207 See id. at 702 (Bratton, J., dissenting and citing authority).
208 Auto. Club of Mich. v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957); Am. Auto Ass'n v. Com-
missioner, 367 U.S. 687 (1961).
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payments, meaning that in substance the prepayments amounted to
interest-free loans. As the previous Part demonstrated, economically
accurate treatment would impute income to Beacon on receipt of the
loan proceeds to the extent an interest obligation was avoided, and
subsequently it would impute interest income to the subscriber (and
provide a deduction to Beacon) as it economically accrued. For exam-
ple, if a five-year subscription prepayment is analogized to a series of
five term loans (one for one year, one for two years, and so on), then
on receipt, Beacon in effect receives five separate payments, each dis-
counted to reflect the time between payment and the date of future
service. The discount would be income to Beacon. 209 At the end of
each year, the corresponding "loan" is repaid together with interest on
all the then outstanding loans. The interest would be deductible to
Beacon and would be income to the subscriber. The subscriber then
uses the loan repayment to purchase the subscription services in that
year ("term-loan treatment"). As an alternative (and the treatment
that would apply under § 7872 if the prepaid amounts were held to
constitute loans), Beacon could be treated as in receipt of an addi-
tional payment from its subscribers each year equal to the interest that
would accrue at a market rate on the loan, which it then would be
deemed to pay at the end of the year to the subscribers ("demand-
loan treatment"). 210 The results to the parties would be substantially
similar to term-loan treatment.
If we assume that subscribers and Beacon are taxed at the same
marginal rate, that the cost of Beacon's subscription services would
rise at the same rate as its cost of funds (for example, the interest rate)
and that liquidity concerns are absent, then the government's attempt
to force a current inclusion of the full $1 million in Year 1 generally
results in the same present value tax liability (taking Beacon and its
subscribers together) as does tax accrual under demand-loan treat-
ment.211 Hence, the effort to include the full $1 million on receipt
becomes an administratively easy way of capturing the gross economic
value of the arrangement, albeit in a way that fails to tax the individ-
209 As previously discussed, this is the treatment specified under § 7872(b).
210 IRC § 7872(a).
211 If, for example, Beacon's cost of funds is 10% and the applicable marginal tax rate is
30%, then current inclusion will result in $300,000 of tax due. Similarly, under demand-
loan treatment, Beacon's fee would be $220,000 after Year 1, resulting in $66,000 of tax, the
present value of which (for example, in Year 0, on receipt) would be $60,000. In Year 2,
Beacon's fee would be $242,000, resulting in $72,600 of tax, which likewise has a present
value of $60,000, and so on. Separately, the deemed interest inclusions and deductions
would be a wash. For example, in Year 1, Beacon would be deemed to receive $100,000 of
subscription income as a separate payment, but it would deduct that $100,000 as interest
paid. IRC §§ 163, 7872. Note that the overall results could be affected by limitations on
interest deductibility. See, e.g., IRC § 1630).
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ual parties accurately. 212 The problem, of course, is that these as-
sumptions often do not hold. Taxpayers frequently will be in different
brackets, will be subject to different borrowing rates, may be subject
to loss limitations of various sorts, and may be liquidity constrained
even though in receipt of an advance payment, requiring them to en-
gage in costly borrowing to cover the tax liability. When any of these
circumstances arises, current taxation of the full prepayment will only
approximate, perhaps quite crudely, the real tax consequences of the
transaction. The effect can be compounded where the arrangement is
canceled in a later year, resulting (under the government's approach)
in a large deduction that may not be fully usable. 213
Section A discusses these issues in particular settings, and Section B
contrasts the advance receipt case with issues arising under the claim
of right doctrine.
A. Advance Receipts
1. Prepaid Services Income
Perhaps the most significant departure from true income taxation
for advance receipts is the taxation on receipt for most items of pre-
paid services income. 214 It is fair to say that the general rule of taxa-
tion reflects the expectation that prepaid services receipts generally
will turn out to be received in exchange for actual services. If so, a
good time to tax them is when they are received. The tax administra-
tor has no interest in permitting the taxpayer to dissipate the fund and
thereby become insolvent before the tax that is likely to be due can be
collected. Therefore, the better presumption is taxation subject to a
later deduction if it turns out the item will never be earned and the
payment is returned.
This rule is inconsistent with the availability of deferral to certain
accrual method taxpayers on advance receipts. As previously dis-
cussed, if the taxpayer can closely tie an advance receipt with associ-
212 Subscribers are never taxed on the interest income that economically accrues to them
over the loan term. See Part III.
213 If, for example, the arrangement is cancelled in Year 2, then under the current inclu-
sion approach, Beacon would have an $800,000 deduction. Depending on Beacon's tax
position, some or all of the deduction may not be usable in Year 2 or, indeed, any other
year.
214 A relatively large literature on prepaid services income exists. Christopher Hanna,
From Gregory to Enron: The Too Perfect and Tax Law, 24 Va. Tax. Rev. 737, 770 n.148
(2005). As previously discussed, much of that literature argues for or against inclusion on
the basis that the matching principle in accounting should or should not apply to prepay-
ments. See, e.g., Steven J. Willis, It's Time for Schlude to Go, 93 Tax Notes 127 (2001)
(arguing for the matching principle); Geier, note 4, at 42 (arguing that the matching princi-
ple is not an income tax value).
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ated future expenditures, the taxpayer may defer inclusion until the
expenditures are made.215 The exception seems to rest on application
of the matching principle, or more precisely on the notion that satis-
faction of the matching principle constitutes a method of accounting
that does not fail to clearly reflect income.216 Thus, the Supreme
Court trilogy denied deferral on the basis that the taxpayer in each
case had failed to match income with expenses with sufficient accu-
racy, while in Artnell and Boise Cascade the taxpayer was permitted to
defer because the showing was adequate. Also as previously dis-
cussed, commentators have rightly criticized application of the match-
ing rule as a basis for determining whether deferral is appropriate in
the advance receipts context. 217 Because the matching rule is de-
signed to serve the accounting principle of determining the profitabil-
ity of a business, whereas the tax rule seeks to identify accessions to
wealth within the tax period, use of the former to determine the latter
improperly imports transactional accounting into the tax law. I have
argued that while this observation is valid, it is beside the point. The
question on advance receipts is whether the taxpayer remains under
an obligation to the payor in order to retain the receipt, not whether
the taxpayer has or will make a profit when the dust settles. To the
extent she does remain under such an obligation, the amount is not
earned, is implicitly subject to an interest charge, and therefore is not
an accession to wealth; rather it is indistinguishable from a loan.
The question here is whether the Artnell/Boise Cascade exception
to the general rule makes practical sense, given that the rule of current
inclusion does, even though it is "wrong" from a pure income tax per-
spective. One approach to the question would reframe the basic rule
of inclusion in terms of the discharge-of-obligation theory rather than
a certainty-of-collection theory. Under the discharge theory, one
might view the general rule as resolving any ambiguity on the question
of the extent of a future obligation in the government's favor. Where
the taxpayer incurs an obligation that extends beyond the current pe-
riod, failure to identify the precise extent of that future obligation cre-
ates a presumption that no future obligation exists. In certain
commonly recurring fact patterns, such as where the taxpayer is re-
quired to provide some amount of service at uncertain times, this may
not be a bad rule, both because there is significant complexity to fore-
casting the extent of future services to be demanded and because the
rule of current inclusion will not substantially distort the taxpayer's
215 Artnell Co. v. Commissioner, 400 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1968); Boise Cascade v. United
States, 530 F.2d 1367 (Ct. CI. 1976); see Section II.A.
216 See IRC § 446(b).
217 Geier, note 4; Gunn, note 169.
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true income where the obligation will be discharged in relatively short
order. As a relatively typical example, consider the situation in
Schlude.218 The taxpayers received payments for a set number of
dance lessons to be provided, typically over a long period of time al-
though in some cases over the lifetime of the customer. The timing of
the lessons was largely in the control of the taxpayers' customers. No
refund for lessons not requested was available. One might suspect
that many if not most of the lessons that customers demanded under
the contract were provided in the year of payment or soon after.
Given the difficulty of realistically accounting for the contingencies in
the amount of service expected in future periods, together with the
relatively minimal distortion resulting from current inclusion if most
lessons were provided soon after the year of receipt, the Commis-
sioner's determination that deferral did not "clearly reflect income"
seems perfectly reasonable.
From this perspective, the Artnell exception to the general rule may
be understood as permitting deferral where the taxpayer has shown
with sufficient precision, not the extent to which the receipt ultimately
represents profit-making activity, but the extent to which the receipt
remains unearned-regardless of whether it is part of a profitable activ-
ity. That is, the matching rule may not be a bad proxy for the dis-
charge rule. If in Year 1 a customer purchases tickets to eighty White
Sox games, half of which occur in that taxable year and half of which
in the next, it is reasonable to view the taxpayer as discharging one-
half of its obligation in each year, regardless of the extent to which
associated expenses are discharged in Year 1 or Year 2. For example,
if all the Year 1 services were provided but the taxpayer went bank-
rupt in Year 2 before any games were played, the customer presuma-
bly would be entitled to a refund of one-half of the purchase price. As
to Year 1, no refund would be available. 219 In this relatively simple
setting, the basis for denying deferral on the ground that the tax-
payer's method of accounting fails to clearly reflect income would
seem quite weak.
A problem with this explanation of the current regime is that it does
not adequately resolve either of the other two trilogy cases, or any
case in which the extent of the future obligation can be clearly identi-
fied. Thus, in both Auto. Club of Mich. and Am. Auto Ass'n (AAA)
the taxpayer received membership payments in exchange for a prom-
218 Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963).
219 One also can look at the example from the perspective of the purchaser. If the White
Sox had gone under after one-half the games had been played, a purchaser would be enti-
tled to a loss under § 165 equal to her basis in the season tickets (subject to the separate
limits on personal losses under § 165(h)).
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ise to provide services for a year.220 Assuming that, on average, a
customer can expect to receive the same quantity of services at any
point during the membership term, the taxpayers in each case should
be viewed as "owning" the receipt only to the extent of the portion of
the membership period elapsed with respect to each member. Put
otherwise, the member contracted for service over the period and, as
in Artnell, presumably would be entitled to a ratable refund if the tax-
payer failed to supply contracted-for services on demand at some
point during the membership term (and, perhaps, to damages associ-
ated with that failure). No refund (or damages) would be available
for periods in which the services had been provided. Any amount not
yet earned should be treated the same as the portion of the receipts
allocable to Year 2 in the Artnell setting. It therefore appears that the
Artnell exception ought to apply more broadly than it does, extending
to any situation in which it is possible to make a reasonable allocation
of the obligation between the current period and future periods.
There are, however, reasons to be wary of extending the deferral
exception to all cases in which it is possible to allocate the services
between current and future periods. The first is that many arrange-
ments may appear to satisfy the allocation rule when they do not, and
as a practical matter it may be impossible for the government to dis-
tinguish between them. Thus, where the services provided are interre-
lated, the extent to which a failure to provide some portion of future
services would vitiate the performance in prior periods is uncertain.
Second, it often will be possible to report earnings in a way that
differs from the proper allocation. Thus, consider a law firm that en-
ters into an arrangement similar to that described previously between
L and C. The firm stands ready to provide counseling services for five
years to its client in connection with a large transaction that will occur
in Year 1. The most expensive services (the ones the senior partner of
the firm will provide) are expected to occur in Year 1, and the balance
of the services are expected to be provided in diminishing quantities in
Years 2-5 by lower-level firm associates, even though the senior part-
ner stands ready to provide services through the entire term. A
proper accounting of the receipt would seem to allocate most of it to
Year 1, but it is not clear how or how to police that rule should a
ratable allocation be reported.221
220 Auto. Club of Mich. v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957); Am. Auto. Ass'n v. Com-
missioner, 367 U.S. 687 (1961).
221 Again, the allocation would have nothing to do with the deduction side. Even if the
majority of the expenses would be expected to occur in Year 1, so that on a transactional
basis the actual profit from the arrangement were more nearly equal from year to year, the
question on inclusion of the receipt would take no account of the associated expenses.
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These considerations suggest that the general rule and the Artnell
exception to it are not terribly wrong. When the prepayment does not
cover an extended future period the distortion under the general rule
will be relatively small, and the reduction in administrative bur-
den-both to the taxpayer and to the Service in policing taxpayer re-
porting-is likely to be substantial. If the taxpayer can make the kind
of unambiguous allocation of discrete services present in Artnell, the
worries over deferral of amounts that represent current income are
essentially alleviated (though the failure to tax the interest inherent in
the loan remains a problem). A material distortion arises where the
arrangement is of the sort present in AAA or Auto. Club of Mich. and
the deferral occurs over a number of years. It is notable that Congress
has provided relief for many such taxpayers that would embody the
discharge of obligation theory advanced here.2 22 The analysis offered
here suggests that these provisions should not be interpreted as exclu-
sive but rather as authorizing the Service and the courts to apply simi-
lar accounting for similar situations not described in those provisions.
2. Loans and Deposits
The treatment of loan proceeds and deposits under the current in-
come tax is also consistent with an effort to tax likely income on re-
ceipt and not to tax on receipt an item that is unlikely to become
income, but it is less clear in this context than in the prepaid services
context that this administrative regime is necessary. As a general mat-
ter, genuine loan proceeds are not a close substitute for income: They
will be repaid. Therefore the appropriate presumption is that no tax
will arise in connection with their receipt, and the corrective is inclu-
sion when it turns out that the presumption is false. 223 Notably, how-
ever, in those instances in which loan proceeds are a close substitute
for income, they are taxed on receipt. For example, a taxpayer who
borrows against an annuity is treated as cashing out the annuity to the
extent of the loan. 224 Similarly, sellers of property under the install-
ment method are treated as selling the purchaser's installment note to
the extent of any proceeds received on pledging the purchaser's
note.225 The reason for these exceptions is that the offsetting obliga-
tion of the borrower is effectively zero, because the income that will
222 See IRC § 455 (prepaid subscription income), § 456 (prepaid dues).
223 Typical situations include cancellation of debt, which generally is included in gross
income subject to limitation for insolvent debtors, see IRC §§ 61(a)(12), 108, and compen-
sation, as long as the parties initially believed the amount was genuine debt or the property
was subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture when it was transferred. See IRC § 83.
224 IRC § 72(e)(4)(A).
225 IRC § 453A(d). The section applies only to installment sales greater than $150,000.
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be used to satisfy the note already exists, which is to say the transac-
tion is effectively a sale. It is not that the security for the loan is avail-
able should the borrower default (that is always the case), but rather
that the security is what the borrower is expected to use to satisfy the
loan.
Contrast the annuity and installment sale rules with the rules for
borrowing against appreciated property. Even in the case of nonre-
course debt, the loan is not treated as a disposition of the property,
226
presumably because in the case of a genuine loan the lender does not
act primarily as a purchaser of the security but as the seller of liquid-
ity.227 Unlike the pledging rules, in the case of genuine debt the grant
of security is a backstop to the promise to fulfill the obligation, not the
sale of property in satisfaction of it. When an installment obligation
or annuity is used as security, however, the arrangement is indistin-
guishable from a prepaid forward sale of the note or the annuity.
228
Deposits are a closer substitute than loans for income, since they
typically function as a reserve against the realistic possibility of non-
payment of a future obligation of the payor, often nonpayment for
services to be rendered.2 29 A blanket rule of inclusion, however,
would be inappropriate, at least where the recipient can be expected
to account for the deposit by appropriately characterizing any hidden
interest in the arrangement. Ordinarily § 7872 would ensure this out-
come, but cases such as Indianapolis Power & Light present a diffi-
226 Woodsam Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952).
227 Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947). Economically, borrowing on a nonre-
course basis is equivalent to borrowing on a recourse basis and purchasing a put option on
the loan. See Shaviro, note 161, at 659-60. The purchase of a put on property one owns
represents a division of the incidents of ownership. The lender assumes the risk of loss
while the borrower retains the benefits of potential appreciation. As a general matter, the
tax law is uncomfortable with such intermediate arrangements and generally will treat ar-
rangements that straddle two distinct boxes as entirely one or entirely the other (examples
include debt versus equity, housing and meals that are provided for the convenience of the
employer versus compensation, and mixed personal and business outlays). Thus, in nonre-
course debt, the actual arrangement is between a sale and a simple loan; where the parties
intend a loan arrangement, the tax law does not regard the transfer of risk in a nonrecourse
loan as so great that it turns the transaction into a sale. See Commissioner v. Tufts, 461
U.S. 300, 308 n.5 (1983) (noting that the tax law could view nonrecourse debt as a coinvest-
ment of the borrower and the lender in the security). Further, the realization rule prevents
previously negotiated loans from turning into sales when subsequent developments make
the probability that the lender will obtain the property much larger, unless and until the
borrower actually puts the property to the lender. See Tufts, 461 U.S. 300.
228 The taxation of prepaid forward contracts ("PPF") is somewhat uncertain. Under
§ 1259, a simple PPF of an "appreciated financial position" typically will be taxable, but if
the payment amount is contingent it may not. See Rev. Rul. 2003-7, 2003-1 C.B. 363 (de-
ferring tax on proceeds received under a variable PPF). Congress evidently has judged,
however, that where the effect of the contract is to circumvent the limits that apply to a
tax-favored item such as an annuity or an installment note, current taxation is appropriate.
229 Bittker & Lokken, note 22, 105.5.
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culty. Because no clear method exists for computing interest on a
deposit where the timing of any refund is contingent,230 the problem
of accounting for the interest both to the payee and to the depositor
remains, though it is not insurmountable. 231 Despite the practical dif-
ficulties of calculating interest, however, the provision of an interest
computation method in § 7872 presumably removes opportunities for
abuse. Further, where the payee is the sort of taxpayer unlikely to
dissipate the deposit, and/or the depositor can be expected to monitor
the holder, worries about nontaxation of the deposit if and when it is
earned would seem overstated.
3. Prepaid Rent Versus Deposit
Advance rent is taxable,232 but a "security deposit" accepted to se-
cure future rent or other obligations of the lessee may or may not be
taxable. 233 As previously argued, whether the item is denominated
advance rent or a security deposit is immaterial if the sole effort is to
tax income when it arises. The administrative questions are whether
there is any reason for concern if payments in substance advance rents
are deferred as deposits until the time the rent is due and, if there is,
whether the concern is addressed by the parties' observance of the
formalities of a deposit.
As contrasted with prepaid services income, rent is often deductible
or amortizable because paid as a business expenditure.2 34 At one
level this fact suggests the government should be less concerned about
whether advance rent is included in income or not, because a corre-
sponding deduction should be available to the lessee if, but only if, the
amount is treated as rent rather than a nonincludible, nondeductible
deposit, and tax on rent, unlike tax on items of prepaid compensation,
is unlikely to prove uncollectible. In short, it is difficult to see why
inclusion of prepaid rent only as and when earned would lead to non-
payment of tax. Most lessors are solvent, and most are not going
anywhere.
230 The arrangement in Indianapolis Power & Light would have constituted a "demand
loan" under § 7872(f)(5), except that customers did not have the unfettered right to de-
mand return of the deposits (although they could demand their deposits back, IPL re-
served the right to cut off service in that event). The final sentence of that Code section
provides for Treasury to promulgate regulations treating any loan having an indefinite term
as a demand loan, but no regulations have been issued to date.
231 See George K. Yin, Of Indianapolis Power & Light and the Definition of Debt: An-
other View, 11 Va. Tax Rev. 467, 487-90 (1991).
232 Reg. § 1.61-8(b).
233 See, e.g., Clinton Hotel Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 128 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1942);
see also Klein, note 3, at 1691-94 (discussing authorities).
234 See IRC § 162(a)(3).
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Like prepaid services income, however, amounts denominated ad-
vance rent are treated on the payor's side under genuine accrual prin-
ciples. In general, advance rent is deductible only ratably over the
lease term,235 subject to a narrow exception where nontax business
exigencies mandate the prepayment and the early deduction does not
distort the taxpayer's income.236 Thus, the same asymmetry in tax
treatment arises here as in the prepaid service income context: ac-
crual principles on the deduction side and cash flow principles on the
income side. These considerations suggest the government's reasons
for insisting on current inclusion for advance rent may have more to
do with revenue raising than with fears about tax evasion or a distor-
tion of income. 237 Requiring deferral of the deduction and current
inclusion creates double taxation. Thus, if the rules on deferral of the
deduction persist for advance rents, the more favorable treatment on
the payee side for deposits represents an opportunity for self-help that
taxpayers should be permitted to take advantage of, when possible.
The disparate treatment of advance rents and deposits on the income
side, coupled with the persistence of accrual taxation on the deduction
side and the fact that worries about noncollection of tax are generally
unfounded, indicate that deposits should continue to be treated as
nonincludible on receipt.
4. The Taxpayer Option
The preceding discussion discloses a further problem that the rules
for taxing advance receipts create for the government, which is that
the existing rules give taxpayers options they would not have under a
pure income tax. Whenever tax rules create electivity, significant re-
ductions in tax will occur and, where electivity requires modification
of behavior, deadweight loss as well.
238
Moreover, the electivity problem is greater than might appear. It is
not confined to the choice to make or receive payments on an advance
basis rather than currently. It also extends to control that taxpayers
have over the tax treatment of payments after they have been made.
Consider again the case of a formally separate loan made in connec-
tion with the provision of future services. Assuming the separate loan
contract is respected, the parties may decide to defer inclusion to the
235 Rev. Rul. 74-589, 1974-2 C.B. 286.
236 Howe v. Commmissioner, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 380 (2000).
237 See Geier, note 4, at 19.
238 See Daniel N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of Realization and Recognition Rules
Under the Federal Income Tax, 48 Tax L. Rev. 1, 57 (1992) ("Taxpayer elections tend to
encourage the substitution of tax planning costs for tax payments, or in other words, excess
burden for the transfer of value to the government.").
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service provider, possibly because the service recipient is more lightly
taxed and the two parties are willing to share the available tax benefit.
The deferral arrangement also gives the parties the opportunity to
lower their tax liabilities based on developments that occur or infor-
mation that becomes available after the contracts are negotiated.
Suppose that effective tax rates change so that the service provider
becomes the more lightly taxed party. The parties may simply cancel
the loan (or part of it) by deeming it to be forgiven.239 The loan can-
cellation would result in compensation income to the service pro-
vider,240 and a deduction to the service recipient. The net effect is to
lower the total tax due. Conversely, where a prepayment was not
structured as a loan because the service provider was initially the
more lightly taxed party, in the case of a rate change in the opposite
direction, the as-yet unearned portion of a previous prepayment could
be "returned," and a new loan plus services contract negotiated.
This difficulty may provide a partial explanation for the govern-
ment's hostility to prepayment arrangements generally. By insisting
on a single rule on the payee side for as wide an array of cases as
possible, and for real economic accrual on the payor side, the opportu-
nities for abuse through the exercise of tax rate options are mini-
mized, though they are not eliminated.
B. Claim of Right
A claim of right represents an unusual kind of payment because it
may well consist, in whole or part, of already created but untaxed
wealth. As contrasted with many advance payments, what is uncer-
tain in such a case is who has the income, not whether there will be
any. By contrast, I have argued that advance receipts generally are
not income to anyone at the time of receipt because there is no in-
come that has arisen as a result of the payment. Rather they (1) will
become income to the payee over time because provided in exchange
for wealth that will actually be created (for example, prepaid services
income for services that later are actually rendered), (2) will never be
income because they will be returned to the payor (for example, loan
proceeds repaid to the lender or prepaid services income for services
cancelled), or (3) will be accounted as an income item to the payee
because they unexpectedly turn out to represent a transfer of wealth
to her from the payor (for example, loan proceeds not repaid to the
239 As an example, the service recipient may have had a zero effective tax rate because
of net operating loss carryovers. See IRC § 172. If the service recipient is acquired in a
tax-deferred transaction, the successor to the recipient may not be able to make use of the
NOL carryovers. See IRC § 382.
240 Rev. Rul. 2004-11, 2004-11 I.R.B. 583.
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lender), in which case an offsetting loss to the payor is allowed. In this
third setting, what is accounted an income event is more properly un-
derstood as a reassignment of income already earned.
North American Consolidated Oil,241 discussed above, illustrates the
difference between a common claim of right case and an advance re-
ceipt. In North American, it will be recalled, the question was who
was entitled to the 1916 profits from oil-producing land. The taxpayer
received and was adjudged taxable on them in 1917, though the tax-
payer might have been called upon to return the profits in a later year.
As contrasted with the typical advance receipt case, here there was no
question that at the time received the item itself represented or would
represent net income to someone. The income, in short, already ex-
isted in 1917. In the advance receipt context, the item is not income
when paid and the practical (though not theoretical) case for taxation
at that time depends on whether it makes sense to view the payment
as giving rise to likely future income. Thus claim of right cases, to the
extent they involve such untaxed income items, raise a practical ques-
tion different from those in the advance receipt cases: Who should be
treated as the owner of an item that is indisputably income, when
ownership of the item is uncertain? The question is to be contrasted
with the usual prepayment questions: Is the item likely to be income
to the transferee and, if so, is receipt the appropriate time to tax it? In
the North American type of claim of right case, the proposition that
someone should be taxed on receipt is stronger because someone does
have income-we just do not know who it is. Unless the tax law is
willing to tolerate unowned income, someone must be taxed.
A pure income rule for a claim of right thus would levy a tax on
payment, to the extent the amount represented already earned in-
come, assuming, as seems reasonable, that all income is owned by
someone. The rule, however, would not make the payee fully liable
for the tax, because the fact that the item is subject to possible repay-
ment means that the real value of the item to the payee is less than its
face amount (even setting aside time value concerns). A true measure
of the payee's income on receipt would discount the amount by the
probability that the payee would have to pay it (or part of it) to some-
one else. The balance of the income would be taxable to that other
person.
242
Needless to say, such a rule would be unworkable in practice. In
most cases it will not be possible to discount the likelihood of repay-
ment. Even if it is, the process of making adjustments over time as
241 286 U.S. 417 (1920).
242 Klein offers a similar analysis of the "pure" claim of right case. Klein, note 3, at
1689-90.
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probabilities shift would be cumbersome at best. Finally, there may
be comity or other reasons that would make discounting inappropri-
ate.2 43 The cash method accounting rule that the courts have adopted
is an appropriate solution in most cases for reasons similar to the
likely income rationale that applies where the prepayment is not itself
an income item but is expected to be later on. In the greater scheme
of things the item received under a claim of right is not (mere) likely
income but actual income, which means there is very good reason to
tax it currently. But with respect to the taxpayer in any individual
case, the item is likely income, or, perhaps better said, it is more likely
income to the taxpayer than to anyone else, assuming the item is ini-
tially assigned to the party most likely to be entitled to it at the end of
the day.244
V. CONCLUSION
A basic if over-simple understanding of a system of production,
ownership, and consumption helps to explain the problems that ad-
vance receipts pose to the tax system. At the most general level, one
might view social organization as an arrangement under which initially
unrealized resources, principally human ability, are first transformed
into wealth as goods or services, possibly then transferred or held, and
finally consumed. The traditional tax bases roughly correspond to the
imposition of tax at these various stages. Thus, a pure income tax is a
tax on putting resources (goods or services) into the public store (pro-
ducing or creating wealth); a consumption tax is a tax on taking them
out; and a wealth tax is a tax on the existence of resources-the inter-
mediate stage between income and consumption.
245
Difficulties in actually taxing the chosen tax base arise because it
may not be possible or even desirable to collect the tax directly. For
example, under the income tax we do not mark all goods to market,
nor do we effectively separate labor income from capital income in
the case of employee owners of enterprises. Rather we defer tax until
realization, and we make simplifying assumptions about the composi-
243 The comity issue would arise where the right to the income item depended on a state
court adjudication of the taxpayer's rights. For example, a federal tax authority might
resist discounting the probability of income inclusion of a state court litigant on the ground
that it was unlikely the state court's ruling would be upheld on appeal. See Commissioner
v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
244 This will not always be the case, of course. An amount awarded to a taxpayer on the
basis of a clearly erroneous lower court judgment is likely to be taken away on appeal, but
the claim of right rule still will apply.
245 See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 387 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1968) (1651).
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tion of the return to various forms of business activity.2 46 Further, a
tax system may seek to achieve other ends, such as controlling con-
duct or implementing distributive principles, that to some extent run
counter to the effort to tax solely on the base chosen. As examples,
the income tax may seek to over- or under-tax income in order to
control externalities, such as the over-production of carbon emissions,
or it may seek to ameliorate the concentration of wealth by taxing
some income more heavily than other income by means of graduated
rates.
In the present context, it is the former set of issues-the impossibility
of taxing the creation of wealth directly-that creates the greatest diffi-
culty for the income tax in dealing with advance receipts. In order to
implement a tax on income, the tax law necessarily makes simplifying
assumptions that, as a general matter, work reasonably well in ensur-
ing that the proper party is taxed at the proper time on the proper
base. Arrangements such as advance receipts or income assignment,
however, violate these assumptions. Thus, the income tax generally
assumes that an individual's receipt of resources signals both their cre-
ation and that the recipient is the person who created them and there-
fore is the proper taxpayer. Advance receipts present the case where
the first assumption is false, and anticipatory assignments of income
present the case where the second is. In the advance receipt context,
the result is the imposition of tax without associated income; in the
anticipatory assignment case, the result is that the wrong party is
taxed.247 Thus, a prepaid service arrangement is not the creation of
wealth but only a contract to create it; the problem for the tax system
is that wealth also moves in a prepaid service arrangement, and the
tax system often treats the movement of wealth as signaling the crea-
tion of income. Nevertheless, only as the wealth is really created may
we say that there is genuine income.248 If that were not the case, in-
246 The case of partnership profits interests is the most salient example of this simplify-
ing assumption. Under current law, these interests generally are taxed as capital even
though it is clear that a large portion of the return from many partnership investments is
due to the labor of the partner. See Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership
Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (2008).
247 See, e .g., Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
248 See Klein, note 3, at 1697-98 (arguing that contracts do not create wealth). One
might object that the definition of income offered in the text fails to account for such items
as cancellation of debt income or the gift exclusion. But the rules for these items reflect
distributional or other decisions, not decisions to tax income (or to exclude it from tax).
Thus, taxation of canceled debt reflects a distribution decision to reassign income formerly
assigned to the lender to the borrower. The distribution principle is reflected in the associ-
ated deduction to the lender. IRC § 166. A pure income tax, however, because it says
nothing about who should bear the tax (only that income is taxed when it appears), would
no less accurately disregard the loss and the windfall to the creditor and debtor, respec-
tively. Similarly, the nontaxation of gifts is matched by the absence of a deduction on the
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come could be multiplied indefinitely by the expedient of entering
into executory contracts, without regard to whether they were com-
pleted. In other words, the act of receipt is only a proxy for income,
not the real thing. In the advance receipt context, the receipt proxy
fails.
Similarly, the person who controls an item ordinarily, though by no
means necessarily, is the one whose income it represents (or who ex-
changed her income for it). Hence, in the typical circumstance the
taxation of the amount under a person's control will not be a bad
proxy for taxing that person's income (assuming the income has not
already been taxed directly). Again, however, the advance receipt
context thwarts the assumption, because control over the advance re-
ceipt itself signals nothing more than a shifting of resources, not their
creation. The fact that a pure income tax axiomatically attributes in-
terest where ownership does not follow control means that the item
cannot be income.
The focus that the Service, courts, and commentators have placed
on facts such as control or use are misplaced because they operate on
wealth or consumption as proxies for income rather than on income
itself. In a simpler world in which all wealth were held by its producer
until consumed by that same person (or exchanged along the way in
an arm's length transaction), any of the proxies associated with in-
come would work fine as a way of taxing income (apart from time
value of money concerns). In the complicated world in which we live,
where income may be owned or consumed by someone other than its
producer and consumption may happen prior to an associated income
event, the use of other tax bases as a proxy for income will result in
improper taxation some of the time. To be sure, administrative, dis-
tributive, or other reasons may well counsel in favor of the use of such
proxies, as Part IV argued. What is critical to understand, however, is
that in using the proxy one only approximately taxes real income, and
the question in these circumstances is whether the departure from in-
come taxation is justified.
transferor side. The decision as to which (as long as not both) of the parties is taxed on a
gift is immaterial from the perspective of an effort simply to tax income; rather the decision
about the proper taxpayer is based on other grounds. See Douglas Kahn & Jeffery Kahn,
"Gifts, Gafts, and Gefts"-The Income Tax Definition and Treatment of Private and Char-
itable "Gifts" and a Principled Policy Justification for the Exclusion of Gifts from Income,
78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 441 (2003).
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